On March 25, the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET) held a forum featuring Chip War author Chris Miller, who delivered a public keynote in Taiwan. The event drew a full house, with representatives from industry, government, and major international and Taiwanese media gathering to discuss the potential geopolitical and technological shifts under a possible second term for Donald Trump.
The forum was moderated by Jeremy Chang, CEO of DSET and Director of its Economic Security Division, and opened with remarks by Yu-Jie Lee, Senior Advisor of the National Security Council. Four senior Taiwanese semiconductor reporters from CommonWealth Magazine, Wealth Magazine, Nikkei Asia, and Reuters also joined the panel for a high-level discussion.
[KeynoteByMiller] Tariffs, Export Controls, and Defense: The Three Pillars of U.S.-Taiwan Cooperation under Trump 2.0
Miller opened by thanking DSET for hosting the event. He noted that since DSET’s founding in 2023, he has worked closely with the organization and was pleased to finally co-host a public forum together.
Addressing key issues for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation under a second Trump term, Miller highlighted three major areas:
🔹 Tariffs: Miller noted that although largely overlooked, the U.S. tariff rate on Chinese goods doubled during Trump’s presidency. As an export-oriented economy, Taiwan would be significantly affected by any new tariffs, even if not directly targeted.
🔸 Export Controls: While Trump did not initially prioritize export controls against China, Miller emphasized that U.S. mid- and senior-level officials in national security and semiconductors are aligned in their intent to tighten controls. These controls are expected to expand beyond advanced semiconductors to include manufacturing equipment, cloud computing access, and R&D partnerships.
He noted that while the U.S. and Taiwanese governments align on this front, frictions may arise for Taiwanese companies in implementing these controls, which must be handled carefully.
🔹 Defense: Miller described Trump’s demands for increased defense spending from Taiwan and European allies as the most tension-filled moment in U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation since the 1970s. He observed that Trump’s pressure strategy, particularly on Germany, has had some success and may soon extend to the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan.
Miller added that Trump’s negotiation style is transactional rather than values-based, citing his remark to Zelensky: “You don’t have cards.” Taiwan should expect tougher U.S. diplomacy over the next few months to years, particularly on semiconductors and defense.
Reflecting on his visit, Miller said, “Many friends in Taiwan’s semiconductor sector told me they wish they could go back to 2014–2015, when politics weren’t such a concern. They didn’t need photo ops with presidents or worry about geopolitical sensitivities in the supply chain.” But, he added, “Unfortunately, there’s no going back. The overlap between semiconductors and geopolitics is far greater than when I began researching this field. Taiwan must face this challenge head-on.”
[PanelDebate] Taiwan’s Senior Semiconductor Reporters Engage in Dialogue
Four veteran reporters who have long interacted with Miller engaged in a dynamic panel discussion. Here are highlights from the Q&A (full transcript to be published soon):
🔹 Liang-Rong Chen, Editor-at-Large at CommonWealth Magazine, noted that Taiwan benefited from Trump 1.0’s supply chain restructuring but was later accused under Trump 2.0 of “stealing” the chip industry. He asked what this policy reversal signifies and how Taiwan’s semiconductor prospects look toward 2030.
Miller responded that with no re-election pressure in a second term, Trump may be more willing to take short-term economic risks to secure his political legacy, which he views as achieving trade balance through tariffs and rebuilding U.S. manufacturing. As for Taiwan, its global semiconductor market share is actually higher now than when Trump left office. “So when I hear people in Taipei say the industry is being ‘hollowed out,’ I ask: What are you talking about? TSMC’s market share is stronger than ever.”
🔸 Ting-Fang Cheng, Chief Technology Correspondent at Nikkei Asia, asked if China’s push to build its own EUV lithography machines poses a real threat.
Miller answered that China has invested massive resources and poached many ASML engineers, but the first global EUV machine took over 30 years to develop, with each generation improving on the last. China isn’t chasing a static target—this is a dynamic, fast-moving technology. “China’s been trying for at least six years and still hasn’t mastered it. Conservatively, I’d say it will take at least another ten.”
🔹 Hung-Ta Lin, Deputy Editor-in-Chief at Wealth Magazine, emphasized the importance of mature-node chips for AI and automotive applications, noting that the U.S. could have just a 10% market share by 2032. He asked how the U.S. might safeguard its supply chain if another chip shortage occurs, and how Taiwan could contribute to resilience.
Miller said that Western firms are hesitant to invest in mature-node chips due to Chinese subsidies and underpricing strategies. While the U.S. considered tariffs on Chinese chips, the complexity of the supply chain makes taxing components extremely difficult. Policies like bans and subsidies are limited in effectiveness unless G7 allies coordinate a joint response.
🔸 Wen-Yee Lee, Taiwan Technology Correspondent at Reuters, asked whether TSMC’s U.S. investment could ease monopoly concerns and avoid U.S. targeting, especially since Trump is still discussing tariffs. Should Taiwan negotiate more or plan further?
Miller replied that the joint press conference with Trump and TSMC was “a tremendous success” in boosting both diplomatic and industrial ties. Trump has publicly mentioned “monopoly” twice, indicating TSMC is now in the same antitrust discussion space as IBM, Microsoft, and Google—an inevitable phase for top tech firms. Taiwan should proceed cautiously.
He added that while investments improve relations, they don’t solve all potential issues. Future bilateral talks will likely cover tariffs, corporate taxes, and non-tariff barriers—complex topics that require long-term preparation.
Jeremy Chang concluded by emphasizing that in the face of growing politicization of the tech war, Taiwan must establish an international policy dialogue framework beyond the corporate level to preserve its voice and options in global competition.
[Audience & Media Q&A]
Several foreign media and think tanks joined the Q&A session.
🔹 I-Chung Lai, President of the Prospect Foundation, asked if Trump’s push for a fully “Made in America” supply chain and job creation will lead to a fundamental shift in U.S. tech policy.
Miller responded: While “Made in America” is politically appealing, the economic cost of true reindustrialization is extremely high. For now, the focus will remain on defense-related industries.
🔸 Will Ripley, Senior International Correspondent at CNN, asked who—China or the U.S.—can more quickly establish a semiconductor ecosystem rivaling Taiwan’s.
Miller answered: The U.S. still holds an edge in equipment and top-tier talent, but China has unmatched political will and financial commitment. It’s the only country willing to build such a system at a loss. He stressed that China’s long-term subsidies pose a global challenge requiring a collective response.
Thanks to all attendees and participants for their insightful questions. DSET will continue to publish related research and host public forums focused on semiconductors, AI, tech security, and international policy—deepening public understanding and policy dialogue.
Event photos and a detailed transcript will be released soon. Follow DSET on social media and our website for updates!
