The second AI+ Expo, organized by the U.S. think tank Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP), was held in Washington, D.C., from June 2 to 4. The Expo attracted over 15,000 pioneers from government, academia, and industry, engaging in in-depth discussions, mutual learning, and the initiation of collaborations on AI and other emerging technologies.
The Taiwanese government actively participated in the conference. In addition to National Security Council Advisor Dr. Yuh-Jye Lee and Ambassador-at-Large Audrey Tang joining the SCSP-hosted session “#StraitForward,” Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao also participated via video, interviewed by SCSP CEO Ylli Bajraktari. The panel, titled “Frontline Taiwan: Innovation, Security, and Freedom,” highlighted Taiwan’s achievements and partnerships in emerging technologies, protection of innovation, and the strengthening of democratic resilience.
DSET’s non-resident research fellows participated in the Expo and hosted the forum on “Taiwan’s Technology and National Security,” focusing on Taiwan’s developments, challenges, and efforts in AI, semiconductors, drones, and energy security. The research outcomes presented during the panel also reflected Vice President Hsiao’s remarks on Taiwan’s achievements in regional stability and democracy, as well as efforts supporting the global supply chain.
Overseas researcher You-Hao Lai presented on “Information Security for Democracies: Taiwan’s Challenges and Resilience in the Face of China’s AI-Driven Authoritarianism,” focusing on the intersection between artificial intelligence and information security, sharing the research findings of the Democratic Governance Program.
Lai began by reviewing the group’s past research, which primarily examined the impact of generative AI during Taiwan’s presidential election and how Taiwan builds a secure and resilient information environment. Two published reports indicated that while AI had not yet significantly influenced public opinion during the election period, attention must still be paid to how foreign information manipulation, enabled by AI to lower costs and increase scale, should be addressed. The reports emphasized that civil society organizations are a distinctive part of Taiwan’s overall cyber resilience defense network. Based on this experience, DSET proposed a three-tier resilience strategy for democratic countries: at the individual and community level, enhancing digital literacy and media fact-checking; at the technical and operational level, improving detection of cross-platform dissemination of AI-altered and disinformation content; and at the institutional level, reinforcing platform accountability, interagency government coordination, and partnerships between public and private sectors and international allies.
He then introduced the group’s primary research focus for the year: how Taiwan can strengthen its sovereign AI development capabilities under pressure from China. In this presentation, he used “data” as an example to highlight China’s high global market share of AI products and how, under the framework of the Digital Silk Road over the past decade, China’s AI has become the new frontier in expanding its domain of data sovereignty. Lai explained how China might collect user data on a massive global scale through both informal channels and formal legal mandates, bringing risks at personal, economic, and national security levels. Lai called for recognition of the systemic risks posed by China’s AI in data collection and application. He urged democratic countries to take immediate and joint action to close loopholes in cross-border data transfer and to halt the continued global expansion of Chinese AI.
Chiang Min-Yen, Deputy Director of the Economic Security Program, presented on the “Global Challenges Facing Taiwan’s Advanced and Foundational Chip Sectors,” providing an in-depth analysis of the challenges faced by Taiwan’s semiconductor industry amid current geopolitical tensions. He pointed out that as China attempts to break through the U.S.-led tech control system, Taiwan bears the brunt of the impact, highlighting the urgency of economic security system reforms. On the industrial development front, Chiang warned that large-scale state subsidies from the Chinese government for mature-node chips will, in the short term, weaken Taiwan’s global industry leadership and pose a substantial threat to global supply chain security.
He further cited two key semiconductor strategies proposed by President Lai Ching-te in his first year in office, including the “Global Semiconductor Democratic Supply Chain Partnership Initiative” and the promotion of the “Non-Red Supply Chain” policy. These strategies demonstrate the Taiwanese government’s proactive participation in international multilateral cooperation and directly respond to China’s unfair trade practices through tilted subsidies and violations of market rules. Chiang also referenced four policy reports published over the past year by DSET’s Economic Security Group, outlining policy objectives that should be considered within Taiwan’s national strategic frameworks.
In his speech, he also called on the international community to rethink the limitations of the traditional concept of the silicon shield. He argued that viewing Taiwan’s advanced chip manufacturing capability solely as a geopolitical deterrent fails to address questions of deterrent effectiveness and underrepresents Taiwan’s strategic role in the global technological democracy alliance. Citing the views of DSET Advisory Board Member Professor Wu Jieh-min, Chiang emphasized that the silicon shield is not merely a defensive tool, but also an opportunity for Taiwan to actively deepen industrial cooperation, strengthen export controls, and align with the standards of international allies.
Regarding the recent concern in Washington over TSMC bare dies flowing to Huawei, Chiang also offered a response. Based on DSET’s research, although Taiwan’s current system can prevent Chinese-funded enterprises from operating directly in Taiwan, Huawei has exploited transparency gaps in the supply chain to bypass review mechanisms and export advanced chips to China. This incident revealed institutional shortcomings in Taiwan’s early-warning systems, corporate reporting obligations, government inspection authority, and intelligence analysis capabilities. He therefore called on democratic technology nations to enhance coordination and establish consistent, binding export control standards to prevent third countries from becoming alternative routes for China to circumvent sanctions. Through case studies, Chiang revealed how the Chinese government uses domestic demand-driven red supply chains, combined with national subsidies to expand capacity, creating price pressure and unfair competition in global markets. In closing, Chiang emphasized that this form of competition is not just an economic issue but poses a systemic challenge to the national security of democratic countries. He called on democratic nations to work together to counter the threat of the Chinese model and prevent their chip strategies from being dismantled one by one.
Hong-Lun Tiunn, Deputy Director of the National Security Program, gave a presentation on “Drones for Democracy: The Strategic Imperative for U.S.–Taiwan UAV Cooperation,” previewing a forthcoming research report on U.S.-Taiwan drone cooperation to be released in mid-June. Tiunn noted that drones have become strategic assets and are especially critical defense tools for small and medium-sized countries. Since the launch of the “National Drone Team,” Taiwan’s drone policy has gradually expanded from military-oriented to a dual-use industrial chain covering both commercial and military applications, while also focusing on regional cooperation with democratic allies. In recent years, the government has invested over USD 1.35 billion, planning to procure 47,000 drones, with a target of producing 180,000 units annually by 2028 and generating an annual output value of USD 1.2 billion.
The presentation also mentioned that Taiwan’s drone exports have grown rapidly, with the European market surpassing the U.S. within just a year to become Taiwan’s largest export destination. However, because Taiwan’s drones have yet to be included in the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Blue UAS” list, they still face difficulties entering the U.S. federal procurement system. To address this challenge, Tiunn proposed a “four-layer cooperation framework” for technical collaboration with democratic countries: starting from basic maintenance, subsystem integration, moving to final assembly, and eventually joint design and certification. The DSET National Security Program also announced it will release a study on Taiwan-Europe drone cooperation in Q3, continuing to explore collaborative opportunities among democratic allies in key technologies and supply chain security.
In response to the SCSP AI+ Expo’s theme, overseas researcher Jia-Shen Tsai of the Energy Resilience Group presented a talk titled “Taiwan’s Energy Policies for AI-industry: Demands, Risks, and Opportunities,” offering an in-depth analysis of the impact of AI data centers on power demand and energy resilience in Taiwan.
Tsai pointed out that electricity demand for AI model training is rapidly increasing worldwide. Although it accounts for less than 10% of overall electricity growth, the concentration of data centers in specific regions may strain the power grid. In Taiwan, for example, there is currently only one hyperscale Google data center, but future AI supercomputers jointly developed by NVIDIA, TSMC, and Foxconn are expected to reach power consumption levels of 100MW. Combined with ongoing electrification and semiconductor expansion, Taiwan’s power grid is facing unprecedented challenges.
The presentation emphasized that AI electricity demand is not just a question of having enough power—it is a challenge of “zero carbon.” Major tech companies, including Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Apple, have all committed to achieving 24/7 carbon-free power by 2030. If Taiwan’s power grid cannot help these tech giants meet their climate goals, it will affect their global deployment and investment decisions.
In response to this wave of AI-driven power demand, DSET proposed three policy recommendations: First, accelerate the upgrade and establishment of substations in northern and central Taiwan to reduce pressure on northbound electricity transmission; second, continue developing distributed grids and power systems to improve grid resilience and emergency backup capabilities; third, promote the installation of on-site power sources such as fuel cells in data centers to reduce grid load, improve power reliability, and allow future transition to green hydrogen for carbon reduction. The DSET Energy Resilience Group will continue to monitor industrial electricity security, track data center electricity trends, and provide policy recommendations on the dynamic interconnection between AI, semiconductors, and energy policy to help Taiwan build green competitiveness amid geopolitical risks.
