DSET hosted the 2025 International Summit on Supply Chain Resilience, opening with a high-level session titled Semiconductor Supply Chain Resilience Dialogue. This session brought together five distinguished experts from Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and South Korea for a deep-dive discussion on critical issues shaping the future of the semiconductor industry—ranging from cross-border governance and export controls to industrial innovation. The panel was moderated by Dr. Jeremy Chih-Cheng Chang, Executive Director of DSET, and featured keynote contributions from Stephen Yates, Senior Fellow for China and National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation; Jimmy Goodrich, Senior Advisor on Technology Analysis at the RAND Corporation; Dr. Kazuto Suzuki, Director of the Institute of Geoeconomics (IOG), Japan; and Dr. Jeong-Meen Suh, President of the Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI).
Highlights from Semiconductor Supply Chain Resilience Dialogue
The session began with a keynote address from Stephen Yates, who offered a forward-looking vision for the future of tech democracies. He emphasized the need to forge a new kind of international alliance centered around emerging technologies—one that responds to the failures of existing trade frameworks, many of which have been compromised or dominated by China. Using the G7 as a reference point, Yates proposed the idea of a “T7” framework—where “T” could stand for either Technology or Taiwan—that would include Taiwan as a core member and coordinate essential resources across rare earths, chip design, and semiconductor manufacturing. He emphasized that in the face of mounting geopolitical risks from China, business interests should not operate in isolation, but must be firmly anchored in the broader context of national security.
Dr. Jeremy Chih-Cheng Chang, speaking from a Taiwan perspective, stressed the importance of strengthening Taiwan’s export control regime to ensure the nation retains the international trust it currently enjoys. He noted that DSET’s research is directly aimed at supporting these policy objectives. Dr. Chang also urged the global community to learn from Taiwan’s supply chain governance experience—especially the way Taiwan has balanced efficiency and economic rationality. While trends such as friend-shoring and manufacturing reshoring are gaining momentum worldwide, he argued that long-term success depends on whether new fabs can operate under viable commercial logic—something Taiwan has demonstrated expertise in.
RAND’s Jimmy Goodrich examined the two-pronged U.S. economic security strategy of protection and promotion, which includes export controls on advanced chips and manufacturing equipment, alongside R&D funding and subsidies through the CHIPS and Science Act. He made clear that U.S. policy is not about monopolizing global semiconductor production, but rather correcting the long-standing overreliance on market forces to counter China’s state-led semiconductor ambitions. Goodrich underscored Taiwan’s irreplaceable role as a strategic partner of the U.S., noting that top U.S. research universities have also contributed significantly to Taiwan’s innovation capacity, making U.S.-Taiwan collaboration both essential and complementary.
Dr. Kazuto Suzuki of Japan’s Institute of Geoeconomics emphasized that while the semiconductor industry remains deeply globalized, rising pressure and influence from China require democratic nations to rethink and strengthen the resilience of global supply networks. He argued that the goal should not be full decoupling, but rather geographic diversification to enhance supply chain stability. Using TSMC’s overseas expansion as a case in point, Suzuki cautioned against viewing these overseas fabs as mere backups for Taiwan. Instead, they should serve as a catalyst to bring Taiwanese firms closer to global talent and R&D ecosystems. He highlighted the TSMC Kumamoto plant in Japan as an example of local integration that is still tightly connected to Hsinchu, forming a transnational and networked system of production and innovation.
Dr. Jeong-Meen Suh, President of the KOSTI, spoke about the new South Korean administration, emphasizing that its core technology policy priorities are already clear—focusing on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and economic security. He noted that there is now bipartisan consensus in South Korea that emerging technologies should be treated as strategic national assets. Dr. Suh explained that Korea’s approach to supply chain resilience is built on two main pillars: stabilizing imports and controlling exports. In early 2024, the government enacted what are known as the “Three Supply Chain Acts,” forming the legal foundation for national supply chain security. In addition, the government established a Supply Chain Stabilization Fund, initially capitalized at 5 trillion won and later expanded to 10 trillion won. These laws define a category of “economic security items,” with semiconductors identified as a core component.
In recent years, South Korea has also amended its Industrial Technology Protection Act to strengthen penalties and preventive mechanisms against the leakage of critical technologies. At the same time, KOSTI, in partnership with the Korea Customs Service, established a Customs Border Risk Management Center to enhance real-time monitoring of export activities. Regarding cooperation with Taiwan, Dr. Suh highlighted the growing demand for AI chips and emphasized the complementary strengths of the two economies—Taiwan in logic chip manufacturing and South Korea in memory chip technologies—creating ample opportunities for deeper industrial collaboration.
Q&A Session
During the audience Q&A session, panelists emphasized the importance of innovation driven by competition, increased capital investment, and enhanced cross-national collaboration. Speakers highlighted that access to capital—whether from the public or private sectors—is critical to advancing industrial development, and that close coordination between industry leaders and policymakers is essential.
Jimmy Goodrich responded to a question from an NCCU scholar by acknowledging Taiwan’s proactive efforts, such as hosting this forum and engaging directly with policy stakeholders from the U.S., Japan, and Korea. He stressed that Taiwan should take the lead in shaping the strategic conversation—by offering new ideas, proposing cooperative platforms, and defining a shared strategic logic with its allies. He also proposed the idea of a “semiconductor version of NATO”—not in the literal sense, but through alignment in operational frameworks, R&D investment, and supply chain rules of origin. “We already have the talent and the trust,” he said. “What’s needed now is institutional architecture.”
Dr. Kazuto Suzuki echoed this view. He described Taiwan as the “geoeconomic hinge between East Asia and the United States,” and argued that institutionalizing interdependence does not compromise autonomy, but rather reinforces it through rules-based trust. He suggested feasible steps such as co-developing common semiconductor standards, sharing risk mitigation protocols across critical fabs and foundries, and establishing pre-agreed crisis response mechanisms among like-minded partners.
Dr. Jeremy Chih-Cheng Chang, CEO of DSET, concluded by stating that Taiwan does not need to choose between autonomy and interdependence. “In fact,” he noted, “true autonomy requires strategic interdependence with like-minded partners. That’s the principle we hope to continue building on.”
This session shed light on the strategic challenges and cooperative pathways facing democracies in the semiconductor domain, offering clear direction for Taiwan’s evolving role in the global tech ecosystem.
Highlights from the Energy, and Drone sessions, along with the full event transcript, will be released soon—stay tuned!
