On December 6, DSET hosted the “2025 Taiwan–Japan–Korea Trilateral Technology Dialogue,” bringing together experts and stakeholders from government, industry, and academia to discuss semiconductors, AI, energy security, and drones.
The energy resilience session featured Katsuya Yamamoto, Senior Research Fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) of Japan; Eun-jung Lim, Professor of the Division of International Studies at Kongju National University; Wei Yang, Researcher at the Taiwan Climate Action Network (TCAN); and was moderated by Dr. Tsaiying Lu, Director of the Energy Resilience Group at DSET.
DSET’s Tsai-Ying Lu: Structural Challenges of Natural Gas Dependence and Geopolitical Risk Facing Taiwan, Japan, and Korea
Dr. Lu opened this session by emphasising that Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are all ranked among the world’s top ten countries most reliant on imported natural gas. She noted that the Trump administration’s continued promotion of the oil and gas industry, along with the Russian war on Ukraine that has drawn global attention to the issue of dependence on Russian natural gas, are both reshaping natural gas investment across the Asian region.
Lu highlighted that over the past few years, China has conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait with increasing frequency, with drill areas aligning with Taiwan’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving ports. This has not only raised the visibility of Taiwan’s energy security issues but also signifies that shipping safety in the Taiwan Strait can impact regional energy supply. Energy vessels bound for Japan and South Korea heavily depend on shipping routes in the waters surrounding Taiwan, making the security of these maritime corridors critical to the energy stability of the entire region. The geographic importance of Taiwan’s position underscores the interconnected nature of energy security challenges facing these three nations.
Former JMSDF Rear Admiral Katsuya Yamamoto: The Taiwan Strait as an Unavoidable Security Issue for Japan and Korea
Yamamoto, a former Japanese admiral and expert on the Chinese military, argued that a Chinese quarantine or invasion of Taiwan would present an existential regional threat. He contrasted the Indo-Pacific’s geography with Europe, where land-based support for Ukraine is feasible. For Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan however, as they are all effectively “islands,” survival is contingent upon vulnerable sea lines. Yamamoto warned that any disruption to these routes, especially a cutoff of energy imports, would impact the whole of society including military operations. Expanding on former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s famous declaration that a “Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency,” Yamamoto asserted that it would also be a “Korean contingency,” with unavoidable consequences for both nations. He stressed that while these nations are economic competitors in peacetime, their joint survival demands close cooperation in the face of a crisis. The ultimate question, he concluded, is not what each can do alone, but what they must accomplish together to navigate shared dangers.
TCAN’s Wei Yang: Positioning Renewable Energy as National Security Infrastructure and Advancing Trilateral “De-Red” Supply Chain Cooperation
Wei Yang, researcher at the Taiwan Climate Action Network (TCAN), outlined Taiwan’s interconnected energy, climate, and security challenges, emphasizing that President Lai has identified energy security, national security, and climate resilience as the nation’s primary concerns. He argued that Taiwan’s energy planning should evaluate each choice’s systemic impact on overall resilience. Drawing lessons from Ukraine’s experience, Wei discussed how fossil fuel dependence creates strategic vulnerabilities during wartime, while nuclear plants can become fixed, high-risk targets. He advocated for Taiwan to learn from the EU’s REPower strategy and Japan’s recognition of renewable energy as national security infrastructure. Wei also highlighted the critical importance of social resilience as a form of national infrastructure, pointing to how fake news about solar panels during Typhoon Danas undermined public trust in renewable energy. He proposed that Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea collaborate on building a de-red renewable energy supply chain through measures including harmonized standards, equipment interoperability, and friendshoring initiatives. He positioned renewable energy not merely as an environmental choice but as essential infrastructure for achieving climate goals while simultaneously strengthening national security and reducing geopolitical exposure to coercion.
Prof. Eun-ting Lin, Kongju National University: Advocating a Taiwan–Japan–Korea Trilateral Mechanism for LNG Security and Energy Governance
Professor Eun-jung Lim described South Korea as a resource-poor economy with a growth model built on energy-intensive industries, deriving approximately 80% of energy and 60% of electricity from imported fossil fuels. Despite this structural fossil fuel dependence, South Korea has made increasingly ambitious climate commitments, with the current government’s 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution targeting 53-61% greenhouse gas emission reductions. The administration established a new Ministry of Climate, Environment and Energy to integrate previously fragmented portfolios—energy security, industrial competitiveness, and climate diplomacy—into a coherent strategy. Lim emphasized the government’s strategic engagement with the United States on trade and investment to secure favorable conditions for traditional exports while anchoring South Korean investment in critical sectors including shipbuilding, semiconductors, and clean energy. She stressed that the Taiwan Strait represents not merely a local or national issue but a global risk, noting that one-fifth of global maritime trade by volume and one-third of global LNG trade passes through this critical chokepoint. Any conflict or heightened tension could trigger severe financial and economic shocks. Lim proposed establishing a trilateral gas community mechanism between South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan featuring shared early warning systems for supply disruptions, strategic stockpiles, swapping mechanisms, regular tabletop exercises involving energy, military, and coast guard officials, and alignment of energy transition strategies through technological cooperation on grid systems, demand response, storage, hydrogen, ammonia, and advanced nuclear. She advocated integrating energy security into regional diplomacy, working with partners like the EU, US, and ASEAN to frame the Taiwan Strait as a global public good for energy and trade rather than merely a flashpoint, while accelerating the transition to low-carbon systems.
Trilateral Cooperation: A Critical Pillar for Sustaining Regional Energy Security
Moderator Dr. Tsaiying Lu asked how Japan, Korea, and Taiwan can balance national security and economic interests while expanding storage capacity. Professor Lim emphasized that LNG storage enhances Korea’s energy autonomy and suggested trilateral collaboration in negotiating Alaska LNG projects with Washington, noting that strategic gas partnerships, particularly with the U.S., can contribute to security. Wei Yang outlined Taiwan’s mid-term strategy: while recognizing LNG as necessary in the short term, it is important to continue accelerating renewables, match infrastructure to peak consumption around 2035, then phase down.
Katsuya Yamamoto from Japan’s Sasakawa Peace Foundation addressed questions about LNG fleet ownership and regional shipbuilding collaboration. He emphasized that unlike other fuels, LNG cannot be stockpiled long-term and requires continuous imports, creating acute supply chain vulnerabilities. Yamamoto illustrated strategic risks by noting that if the Malacca Strait becomes unavailable, LNG shipments from the Middle East to Japan would extend from 9,000 to 12,000-14,000 nautical miles, with Australian routes facing similar expansions. This increased voyage time directly requires proportionally more vessels—approximately 1.5 times more for Middle East-Japan routes and 1.35 times more for other routes—to maintain consistent supply flows, underscoring how maritime chokepoint risks create cascading effects on fleet requirements and regional energy security.
