The RightsCon opened in Taipei on February 24, 2025, where the Center for Technology, Democracy and Society (DSET) hosted a satellite session. The center invited scholars Charles Mok from Stanford University’s Global Digital Policy Incubator, Andrew Yeh, CEO of the UK think tank China Strategic Risks Institute (CSRI), and Titus Young, co-director of Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG), to exchange views with DSET on issues vital to Taiwan’s digital security, including the geopolitical risks in Taiwan’s semiconductor supply chain, public-private strategies to counter information manipulation, and undersea cable networks.
The event attracted a full audience of nearly one hundred attendees. Additionally, DSET co-hosted a welcome reception with the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club (TFCC) for RightsCon participants, also attracting nearly one hundred people, aiming to strengthen connections between Taiwanese think tanks, foreign media reporters, and international research and advocacy organizations.
Building a Democratic Semiconductor Supply Chain
DSET Executive Director Chang Chih-cheng pointed out that Taiwan currently holds a 50% market share in global mature process chips, but according to the latest intelligence forecasts, China will replace Taiwan’s position in two years. Chang emphasized that Taiwan’s semiconductor supply ecosystem holds an irreplaceable and indispensable position for democratic countries. Taiwan is willing to deepen interdependence among democratic nations through friendshoring, jointly enhancing the security and prosperity of global democracies. Accordingly, Taiwan must be included in the process of reshaping the economic security order to ensure that democratic countries’ supply chains can limit the expansion of authoritarian countries’ supply chains.
DSET Economic Security Deputy Director Chiang Min-yen analyzed how China supports semiconductor companies in key areas through mechanisms such as large funds, many of which are related to the PLA’s modernization plans. Using China’s Nexchip as an example, the company was established with assistance from Taiwan’s Powerchip Group but rapidly expanded with Chinese government support, increasing monthly production capacity from 10,000 wafers in 2018 to 110,000 last year, with profits reaching NT$1.3 billion in 2024, while Taiwan’s Powerchip recorded losses of NT$4.2 billion. Chiang further compared the massive subsidies received by three Chinese wafer material suppliers, which can invest in new facilities despite unstable net profits, highlighting China’s strategy of prioritizing policy goals. He suggested that Taiwan needs to maintain cost-effectiveness through export controls and tariffs to enhance its position in the democratic semiconductor supply chain.
DSET Visiting Scholar and Jamestown Foundation researcher Chang Kun-yang noted that China has prioritized automation and robotics technologies and applied them to military use. China’s mature process capacity is growing at an annual rate of 12%, far exceeding the global demand growth rate fourfold, creating an overcapacity problem that threatens democratic countries like Taiwan and the United States. The US has recently begun to focus on the importance of mature process chips and has invoked Section 301 to investigate Chinese subsidies. He believes that China has turned to using mature processes to advance areas such as space programs, and regulating only advanced chips is insufficient to contain China.
Challenges and Responses to Information Manipulation
DSET Deputy Director Chou Mu-yi focused on the impact of generative AI on information manipulation during Taiwan’s 2024 elections. She categorized civil society organizations into media literacy promotion, fact-checking, and anti-information manipulation analysis groups, but noted an overall lack of effective evaluation systems. She emphasized that while generative AI currently has limited influence in elections, it has the potential to deepen social biases and weaken democratic institutions, necessitating improved public media literacy and platform accountability mechanisms.
DSET Democratic Governance Director Huang Kai-shen shared details from a forthcoming report to be released next month, which uses the Disarm Blue framework to analyze Taiwan civil society’s anti-information manipulation strategies. He mentioned three major strategies adopted by civil society organizations: enhancing public media literacy, improving information transparency and accuracy, and mitigating the impact of information manipulation. However, Taiwan’s current efforts remain concentrated in specific areas with room for improvement, suggesting strengthened public-private collaboration and legal frameworks.
IORG Co-director Titus Young believes that China’s information manipulation aims to reduce democratic legitimacy and resistance to authoritarian regimes. During the 2024 elections, the CCP commissioned the dissemination of fake polls and paid online influencers to beautify conditions in Xinjiang and Tibet. Using databases and facial recognition technology, IORG discovered that in October and November 2024, China’s propaganda most frequently cited 20 Taiwanese figures, including retired military personnel and opposition party leaders, to discredit Taiwan’s defense. He recommended public-private cooperation, international media collaboration, and community activities to raise public awareness, along with cross-disciplinary research to ensure diverse and accurate information access rights.
Strengthening the Resilience of Network Infrastructure
Stanford University scholar Charles Mok explored the importance of undersea communication cables to Taiwan, noting that they carry over 99% of international data transmission yet are vulnerable to natural disasters and human sabotage. China now holds patents for cable-cutting technology, indicating that such gray-zone threats will only increase. In contrast, satellites are only suitable for emergency use due to capacity and signal delay issues and cannot replace cables. Charles recommended strengthening regional cooperation between Taiwan and countries like Japan and the Philippines, increasing cable investment and Taiwan’s autonomous investment, and viewing this as an economic rather than merely a national security issue to attract investment.
UK think tank CSRI CEO Andrew Yeh focused on the role of undersea cables in energy security, noting their use in transmitting offshore wind power and cross-border electricity. He cited UK-Morocco cooperation, which plans to power 7 million households by 2030, and potential Taiwan-Philippines connections as examples, emphasizing the importance of international cooperation for diversifying energy sources. However, he pointed out that cables are vulnerable to physical threats, with only about 60 repair ships globally, repairs taking weeks to months, and legal accountability presenting difficulties. He recommended establishing repair ecosystems, strengthening monitoring, enhancing international accountability, and investing in protection technology development.
This RightsCon exchange highlighted three major digital security challenges facing Taiwan: geopolitical risks in the semiconductor supply chain, information manipulation threats, and network infrastructure security. DSET and the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents’ Club (TFCC) also co-hosted a post-conference networking event to continue exploring these key issues while international friends gathered in Taiwan.
Facing these challenges, Taiwan needs to adopt multi-layered response strategies; strengthening security in these three areas is not only crucial for Taiwan’s own development but also an important link in ensuring the common security and prosperity of global democracies. Only through cross-domain integration, public-private collaboration, and deepening international partnerships can Taiwan effectively enhance its resilience in an increasingly complex digital geopolitical environment.