Beijing is increasingly integrating submarine power cable infrastructure into its broader geopolitical strategy, leveraging it to advance the One Belt One Road Initiative and expand its global influence. In a recent article published in China Brief, Tsaiying Lu, Director of Energy Resilience and Sustainability Program at DSET, and visiting scholar Athena Tong warn that the PRC is actively seeking to establish dominance in the submarine power cable sector. Through this effort, Beijing is deepening integration with the critical infrastructure of other countries, raising significant security concerns for partner nations.
The article points out that the PRC has designated submarine cable technology as strategic national infrastructure, underpinned by the political slogan “managing the ocean, strengthening the country through the sea”. Ningbo Orient Wires & Cables currently leads the sector within the PRC, commanding nearly 40 percent of the domestic market share.
As a textbook example of a PRC “single-item champion enterprise”, Orient Cables specializes in a niche market, leads globally in technological innovation, and holds a dominant share in both domestic and international markets. With strong financial support from the Chinese government, the company has actively expanded abroad. In addition to its role in the One Belt One Road Initiative and the Global Energy Interconnection Strategy, Orient Cables has steadily advanced its international presence. In 2022, the company established an office in Rotterdam to cover the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom, and has laid over 12,000 kilometers of submarine cables worldwide. In 2024, Orient Cables acquired a 2.4 percent stake in a transnational energy transmission project linking Morocco to the United Kingdom via submarine cables routed through the territorial waters of Morocco, Spain, Portugal, and France.
The PRC is strategically exporting submarine power cable infrastructure around the globe, creating long-term dependency risks for other countries. The article draws parallels to previous cases of strategic dependence, such as Russia’s use of Germany’s reliance on the Nord Stream 1 pipeline to exert political leverage, or the security vulnerabilities faced by Western nations due to reliance on Huawei for critical telecommunications infrastructure.
The authors conclude by warning that as PRC technologies become embedded in the critical infrastructure of foreign countries, governments must recognize the inherent risks associated with any form of dependency. Reliance on PRC-produced submarine power cables may pose ongoing strategic risks for countries seeking to reduce their dependence on the PRC. Backed by state support, the global expansion and strategic acquisitions of PRC firms in this sector may replicate patterns of technological dominance that have emerged in other fields.
