Elena Yi-Ching Ho, Non-Resident Fellow at the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET), published an op-ed titled “Taiwan Is More Than a Sideshow in Australia’s Indo-Pacific Strategy” in the international outlet The Diplomat. In the piece, she urges Australia not to overlook Taiwan’s strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific while seeking closer economic cooperation with China. Instead, she calls for deepening Taiwan-Australia bilateral cooperation to enhance regional supply chain resilience and shared security interests, and to avoid repeating the pitfalls of economic dependence on China that could undermine Australia’s overall Indo-Pacific strategic posture.
Ho notes that Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s recent visit to China, whcih is his second since November 2023, signals rapidly warming bilateral ties. However, she warns that Australia’s past experience of facing retaliatory trade sanctions from China after launching an inquiry into Beijing’s handling of COVID-19 underscores the risks of overdependence. Such reliance could leave Australia vulnerable to renewed economic coercion and constrain its diplomatic flexibility in the event of escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait, ultimately weakening its ability to respond strategically in the Indo-Pacific region.
The article emphasizes that while Taiwan’s population and market size are smaller than China’s, it remains Australia’s seventh-largest export destination and 12th-largest two-way trading partner. More importantly, Taiwan holds global leadership in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, cybersecurity resilience, and high-tech innovation — all of which align closely with Australia’s Future Made in Australia industrial strategy — and should be regarded as a crucial strategic partner.
Ho highlights that Taiwan, despite producing 60 percent of the world’s semiconductors and 90 percent of its most advanced chips, faces challenges including insufficient renewable energy supply and growing variability in water resources. The rapid expansion of the AI industry has further intensified its energy and resource demands. She argues that these challenges create major opportunities for collaboration: Australia is Taiwan’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas and is actively developing hydrogen and solar energy, while Taiwan leads the world in ultrapure water recycling and engineering integration technologies. TSMC, for example, aims to use 100 percent recycled water in production — expertise that could support Australia’s development of a low-carbon hydrogen industry as it grapples with chronic water scarcity.
Beyond energy, Ho points out that while Taiwan has strong R&D and manufacturing capabilities, it lacks access to critical minerals — an area where Australia is a leading global supplier. Leveraging these complementary strengths, both sides could bolster regional supply chain security and advance high-tech industrial cooperation.
She also cites Taiwan’s Representative to Australia Douglas Hsu, who has noted that New Zealand, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have all demonstrated that it is possible to deepen substantial partnerships with Taiwan under the “One China Policy.” Ho stresses that Australia can follow suit without provoking Beijing. She urges Australia to uphold the Albanese government’s guiding diplomatic principle — to “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must” — and ensure that engagement with China does not come at the expense of equally important strategic partnerships, particularly with Taiwan, thereby preserving the flexibility of its Indo-Pacific strategy.
