Introduction

Chip smuggling has become a key target of U.S. export control enforcement. Its cross-border nature, often involving U.S. allies, makes Japan directly relevant. A chip smuggling network has been established in Japan by Chinese united-front agents, smuggling brokers, and local collaborators. 

Calling themselves “Prometheus” — after the figure who stole fire from Mount Olympus and gave it to humans, enabling the development of civilization — these intermediaries are dedicated to transferring U.S.-controlled AI chips to China. The name itself underscores Chinese actors’ drive to obtain restricted chips. Authorities in democratic countries must therefore strengthen enforcement and integrate economic security into a broader anti-smuggling framework.

This concern has become more urgent as the Super Micro smuggling case has escalated, with judicial authorities in both Taiwan and the United States currently investigating the matter. In March this year, the U.S. Attorney’s Office charged three individuals associated with Super Micro—Yih-Shyan “Wally” Liaw, Ruei-Tsang “Steven” Chang, and Ting-Wei “Willy” Sun—alleging that they used intermediaries (“Company-1”) in Southeast Asia to sell servers equipped with NVIDIA GPUs to China.

In addition to the Southeast Asia route, the suspects allegedly used Japan as part of the network. Their activities in Japan involved two key figures. Wally Liaw, co-founder of Super Micro, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Japanese company Shinto Holdings (新都ホールディングス 株式会社). Willy Sun registered a company called Hashcat Japan in Japan, which served as a distributor to rent and sell servers manufactured by Super Micro. In addition, the Chinese-linked entities in Japan connected to these key figures further reveal the community ties and operating logic behind a chip-smuggling network spanning the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and China.

Graph 1: the two smuggling routes

(Source: composed by DSET)
Note 1: the flow of chips is marked by arrows
Note 2: unconfirmed flow of chips is marked by dotted arrows

Shinto Holdings and its Chinese background

Shinto Holdings had a close relationship with Hashcat Japan. According to an announcement disclosed in December 2024, Shinto Holdings signed a MOU with Super Micro in September of that year to support the development of Shinto Holdings’ AI computing business. Two months later, in November 2024, Sun registered Hashcat Japan in Japan. In the same announcement, Hashcat Japan was described as an authorized distributor of Super Micro GPUs.

In August 2025, Shinto Holdings announced that it had sold 500 GPUs, procured from HASHCAT, to High Mountain Global Limited, a company it described as being based in Taiwan. However, our investigation found no official record indicating that a  company under the name High Mountain Global Limited was registered in Taiwan .

What makes Shinto Holdings notable is that it did not appear out of nowhere, but had a long operating history in Japan. Shinto Holdings was established in Tokyo in 1984 and was originally dedicated to the recycling of scrap metal and plastics for resale both within Japan and overseas. In recent years, it has also expanded into real estate services and the import and export of daily consumer goods. 

Notably, Shinto Holdings’ commercial network in Japan appears to have close ties to the Chinese business community in Japan through its president. Based on two corporate announcements, the president was originally named Deng Meihoi (鄧明輝) and only changed his surname to Tsukamoto Meihoi (塚本明輝) in August 2025. In the end of the announcement published on August 12 of 2025, it noted that the CEO’s name would be changed to Tsukamoto Meihoi by then. This shift from a Chinese-style name to a Japanese-style name was also confirmed in another announcement published in September 2025.

Moreover, Deng has played an active role in the Chinese business society in Japan, serving as the president of the Association of Chinese Listed Companies in Japan (日本華人上場企業協会). The association comprises 20 Chinese-owned listed companies established in Japan during the 1980s and 1990s. At its inaugural meeting, the Chinese Embassy in Japan dispatched two consuls to attend the ceremony, indicating that the association received considerable attention from the Chinese government.

Although there is currently no direct publicly available information confirming that Shinto Holdings was involved in NVIDIA GPU smuggling to China, the company’s role still warrants further scrutiny. As the Super Micro case has continued to escalate, Shinto Holdings announced on June 24 that it had terminated its business partnership with HASHCAT. However, whether and how Shinto Holdings’ long-standing business network, as well as its ties to Chinese business elites in Japan, may have played a role in potential chip-smuggling activities remains an issue worth further investigation.

Chip Smuggling, Influence Operations, and Scamming

Nevertheless, a review of Shinto Holdings’ business documents inadvertently revealed a potential transnational chip-smuggling network. The network also allegedly involved other illicit activities, including political infiltration and fraud in Taiwan.

In the December 2024 announcement, Shinto Holdings is reported to have entered into an MOU not only with Super Micro but also with a third entity: “Toyo Company” (東洋會社), registered under Jia Shao-Lian (賈紹連) and located in Bunkyo, Tokyo. This company was originally established in Osaka in 2016 under the name Fukutsu Co., Ltd. (福通株式会社) and subsequently underwent six changes in its registered address and corporate name. Finally, it was renamed PROMETHEUS Co., Ltd. (PROMETHEUS 株式会社) in January 2025 and later changed its registered address to Yokohama, Kanagawa Prefecture in October 2025.

Graph 2: the chip smuggling network in Taiwan, Japan, and China

Note 1: the flow of chips is marked by arrows
Note 2: the relationship between businesses is marked by dashed arrows
Note 3: unconfirmed flow of chips is marked by dotted arrows

PROMETHEUS Co., Ltd. was owned by Jia, a Chinese businessman who appears to have operated across East Asia and played a role in both chip-related transactions and influence operations. First, Jia showed strong interest in acquiring chips from the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. For instance, in 2023, he and other Chinese actors obtained chips manufactured by a Taiwanese company with the help of another Taiwanese collaborator, Hsu Shao-Dong (徐少東). Hsu forged documents from a Taiwanese semiconductor company, falsely presenting himself as closely connected to the semiconductor industry in order to gain the trust of Jia and other Chinese agents. 

Moreover, in an investment fraud case involving Hsu and Jia, the latter mentioned that he planned to invest in a Japanese company, Datasection Inc. Coincidentally, this Japanese cloud service provider was revealed last December to have enabled Tencent to access Blackwell chips. Viewed from another angle, after Sun and Liaw were arrested, Shinto Holdings claimed that these two individuals had been introduced by a Chinese intermediary. This raises the question of whether that intermediary may have been Jia, or whether Jia’s network at least offers a window into the type of business relationships behind the Chinese intermediary identified by Shinto Holdings.

Beyond chip smuggling, Jia has also been involved in political infiltration in Taiwan. According to Taiwan’s Investigation Bureau, Jia allegedly acted as a Chinese united-front agent: in 2023, he instructed Hsu to organize Chinese migrants and disseminate false polling data in an attempt to influence the 2024 Taiwan Presidential Election. In this case, a company named “Japan Toyo Technology League” (日本東洋科技聯盟), whose name closely resembles Jia’s “Toyo Company” involved in the chip-related transactions discussed above, paid USD 300,000 to Hsu. 

Currently, Hsu is a fugitive overseas and is wanted by authorities. As for Jia, the currently available information is limited: a LinkedIn profile attributed to him can be found, listing Yokohama, Japan as his location. 

(Source: LinkedIn)

Implications

To conclude, the DSET economic security research team draws several policy implications from the network surrounding Shinto Holdings. 

The “Chip-smuggling transformation” of Chinese business in Japan

When discussing “white glove” companies in the chip smuggling industry, most people would likely think of firms newly and specifically established for this purpose. However, the case in Japan suggests that the PRC could also leverage the local Chinese network, which has been established for decades. Furthermore, to expand their business and influence within the local community, some Chinese businessmen may also be willing to cooperate with the PRC.

Strengthening enforcement efforts in Japan

The priority for the Japanese government is to strengthen enforcement. Chip smugglers may collaborate not only with newly established shell companies, but also with locally operated companies that already have business records in Japan. Compared with Southeast Asian countries, Japan is generally not perceived as a jurisdiction where smuggling activities are widespread. As a result, domestic legal frameworks and external regulatory enforcement tend to be comparatively weaker.

Current economic security policies are also primarily designed to prevent the outflow of Japanese technology and products, while paying less attention to scenarios in which no Japanese technology is directly involved and Japan merely serves as a transit or operational venue for smuggling activities.

Integrating economic security to anti-smuggling campaigns

Recently, Japan has faced growing scrutiny over allegations that it has become a hub of smuggling drugs and chips. Through Chinese organizations in Japan, China has allegedly exported fentanyl to the U.S. and imported restricted chips from the U.S. In response, the Japanese authorities strengthened cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in May 2026 and expanded the scope of foreign investment screening in June 2026. 

To further strengthen efforts to combat chip smuggling, DSET recommends integrating economic security concerns into Japan’s broader anti-smuggling framework. First, the government should verify whether companies importing or leasing AI servers are genuinely engaged in AI-related business activities. Second, greater attention should be paid to the deployment and actual use of imported servers to identify suspicious patterns or potential diversion. Finally, customs authorities should strengthen scrutiny of high-end technology products destined for China to reduce the risk of illicit transfers.