台灣半導體出口政策的難題

In the recent U.S. presidential election, the semiconductor trade issue catapulted Taiwan into the spotlight. During the September 10 debate, Vice President Kamala Harris criticized former President Donald Trump for enabling China’s military by allowing the sale of American chips during his tenure. “Under Donald Trump’s presidency, he ended up selling American chips to China to help them improve and modernize their military—basically sold us out,” Harris asserted. 

半導體貿易議題在最近的美國總統選舉中使台灣成為全球關注的焦點。在九月十日的辯論中，副總統賀錦麗批評前總統川普在任內並未禁止向中國銷售美國的晶片，從而助長中國的軍事現代化。賀錦麗指出：「在川普的總統任內，他將美國晶片賣給中國，以幫助他們提升並現代化其軍力——基本上是出賣了我們」。

Trump retorted, “First of all, they bought their chips from Taiwan. We hardly make chips anymore because of philosophies like they have and policies like they have.” 

對此，川普回應道：「首先，他們的晶片是從台灣買的。因為他們遵循的那些理念和政策，我們幾乎不再生產晶片了。」

Despite their heated exchange, both sides concurred on the need to restrict China’s access to crucial technologies that could fuel its military modernization. But Trump’s comments about the semiconductor trade between Taiwan and China brought to light a lingering concern: Taiwan’s equivocal stance on semiconductor export controls and the degree of its collaboration with the U.S. to limit advanced technology transfers to China. 

儘管辯論交鋒激烈，但雙方都承認有必要限制中國取得可能加速其軍事現代化的關鍵技術。然而，川普對兩岸半導體貿易的評論揭露了一個長期的隱憂：台灣在半導體出口控制，以及與美國合作限制向中國轉移先進技術方面等立場含糊不清。

With the U.S. and China locked in ongoing contention, the strategic importance of this issue cannot be overstated. Taiwan’s role is crucial in ensuring the effectiveness of U.S. restrictions against China, given its market-leading share in the global advanced semiconductor industry. The issue has also taken on diplomatic urgency as Japan and the Netherlands — both vital suppliers of manufacturing equipment, materials, and components for advanced chip production — have now toed the line with U.S. policy.

在美中對抗的環境下，此議題的戰略重要性不容小覷。台灣在全球先進半導體產業中占據領先的市場份額，對於確保美國針對中國限制措施的有效極為重要。這一問題隨著日本及荷蘭兩大晶片生產設備、材料與元件的供應國紛紛配合美國政策，而變得日益迫切。

Yet Taiwan’s position on such a critical matter is puzzlingly ambiguous. While China — the main focus of U.S. export controls — aggressively asserts its claims over Taiwan through increased military and political pressure, Taiwan continues to ship semiconductors to Chinese entities. This ongoing trade with China paradoxically feeds into the very threats to Taiwan’s existence. Why, then, does Taiwan persist with these exports?

然而，台灣在這一關鍵問題上的立場仍顯得反覆。即便中國是美國出口控制的主要對象，且中國持續透過軍事和政治方面的施壓來積極主張對台灣的主權，台灣卻仍舊向中國出口半導體。這種對中國的持續貿易，反讓台灣面臨生存的威脅。那麼，台灣為何仍然堅持這些出口貿易？

台灣的浮士德式悲劇 Taiwan’s Faustian Tragedy

The obvious unbalanced tradeoff between economic interests and national security is, in itself, a moral quandary that could leave Taiwan vulnerable to criticism for its mercantilist short-sightedness. Nevertheless, the tragic nature of this self-inflicted vulnerability can hardly be ignored, particularly the structural politico-economic constraints that Taiwan has been compelled to confront in its longstanding struggle with China. 

經濟利益與國家安全之間顯著不平衡的抉擇本身就是一個道德困境，可能會讓台灣因為短視的重商主義而遭受批評。然而，這種看似自作自受的脆弱性，其蘊含的悲劇色彩實在難以忽視，特別是在長期與中國抗衡中，台灣不得不面對的政治經濟結構性限制。

The irony of Taiwan’s export of advanced semiconductors to China — used by the latter for military intimidation — echoes a familiar historical parallel. Beginning in the 1980s, as China opened its economy to the world, Taiwanese firms — seeking new markets and lower production costs — invested heavily across the strait. Taiwanese firms played a key role in sectors such as electronics, textiles, and machinery, spurring China’s industrial development. In return, they reaped the benefits of reduced costs and access to a burgeoning market of over 1.3 billion people, solidifying their global competitiveness.

台灣將先進半導體出口至中國的諷刺之處在於，這些半導體被中國用於提升對台的軍事威脅，如同一段似曾相似的歷史。自1980年代起，隨著中國改革開放，台灣企業為了尋求新市場和降低生產成本，大量西進投資。台灣企業在電子、紡織及機械等行業扮演關鍵角色，推動中國的產業發展。台灣企業透過壓低成本及進入超過13億人口的新興市場的好處，從而鞏固其全球競爭力。

But what began as an economic partnership soon morphed into a strategic risk. These investments helped transform China from a developing nation into a global superpower, with vast economic and technological resources. Back home in Taiwan, this expansion came with its own challenges — job losses and growing economic dependence on China. By the 2010s, China had leveraged its wealth and industrial growth to foster domestic industries that began to compete with Taiwanese firms, ultimately driving many, such as Foxconn, to withdraw their production from the Chinese market.

但兩岸的經濟合作很快演變為戰略風險。這些投資幫助中國從一個發展中國家變成擁有龐大經濟及科技資源的全球強國。在台灣，這種西進擴張帶來許多問題，包括失業問題及加深對中國的經濟依賴。到了2010年代，中國已利用其財富和工業成長，培育出能與台灣企業競爭的國內產業，最終迫使許多企業，如富士康，撤出中國市場。

Today, this Faustian bargain continues. Taiwan, as the world’s premier producer of advanced chips — holding over 90% of the global market share — still supplies essential components to Chinese industries. While these semiconductors are vital for Taiwan’s economic growth, they also enhance China’s military capabilities, including missile guidance systems, thus jeopardizing Taiwan’s own security.

如今，這種浮士德式的交易依舊進行中。作為全球頂尖的先進晶片生產者，台灣控制著超過90%的全球市場佔有率，仍然為中國產業供應關鍵科技。儘管這些半導體對台灣的經濟增長極其重要，但它們也提升中國的軍事能力，包括導彈導航系統，這直接威脅到台灣的安全。

根深蒂固的困境 The Entrenched Dilemmas

These are all highly palpable strategic risks that require Taiwan to adopt decisive action. This urgency is further amplified by Japan and the Netherlands recently following the U.S. to implement export controls on semiconductor manufacturing technologies. As Taiwan approaches a critical decision point in the U.S.-China technological competition, its reluctance to take firm action could be seen as a strategic misjudgment, potentially placing it in a disadvantageous position. 

這些都是台灣必須采取果斷行動的明顯戰略風險。近期日本和荷蘭跟隨美國實施對半導體製造技術的出口管制的決定，更加突顯了台灣採取行動的迫切性。隨著美中科技競爭的白熱化，台灣的猶豫不決可能被解讀為戰略上的誤判，並使其處於不利位置。

However, such a view might oversimplify the complex decision-making dilemmas that have deeply ensnared Taiwan in this difficult situation, in both strategic and diplomatic terms.

然而，這種觀點可能過於簡化，無論是在戰略上還是外交上，台灣長期深陷的複雜決策困境。

In Taiwan, concerns remain about the potential domestic repercussions of export controls. While these measures can prevent adversaries from accessing critical semiconductor technologies, they may also harm the very businesses that have propelled Taiwan to its prominent position in the chip industry, potentially stifling both domestic innovation alongside foreign capabilities. 

出口管制可能帶來的負面影響仍引發了台灣國內的擔憂。這些措施雖可阻止敵對勢力獲取關鍵半導體技術，卻可能損害推動台灣晶片產業崛起的企業，從而抑制其海內外的創新能力。

Chinese customers might seek alternative suppliers in countries that do not enforce similar export controls. This shift, currently termed as “De-Americanization” in the Chinese chip industry, could soon precipitate a “De-Taiwanization.” And it may not be long before Taiwanese companies begin relocating their operations overseas to circumvent local regulatory constraints.

中國客戶可能會轉向那些未實行類似出口管制的國家尋找替代供應商。這種轉變，目前被稱為中國晶片產業的「去美國化」，很快可能演變成「去台灣化」。台灣公司可能不久後會開始將業務遷移到海外，以逃避台灣本地的規範限制。

However, a deeper concern arises from the cautionary precedent set by US export controls since the trade war began in 2019. These restrictions have driven China to invest at least $150 billion in its domestic semiconductor industry, form new public-private partnerships, and encourage local sourcing among companies. Such initiatives have greatly enhanced China’s research capabilities and innovation agenda. As a result, China is developing internal commercial relationships and technological capacities that might not have emerged had access to U.S. technologies remained unrestricted. Taiwan could face a similar scenario.

然而，美國自2019年中美貿易戰開始後所設下的出口管制帶來了更深層次的擔憂。這些限制使得中國在其國內半導體產業投資至少1500億美元，形成新的公私合作夥伴關係，並推動企業間的本土採購。這些措施顯著提升中國的研究及創新能力。因此，中國正在大力發展內部商業關係及技術能力，這些在未受美國技術限制的情況下可能不會發生。台灣若進一步限制對中的半導體出口，可能造成類似的情況。

On the strategic level, Taiwan is trapped between its economic interests in China and its security ties with the U.S. Despite the deteriorating cross-strait relations, China remains Taiwan’s largest export market. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, in 2023, China accounted for 35.2% of its total exports—this was even the lowest proportion in nearly 21 years, an 18.1% reduction from 2022.

在戰略決策上，台灣在其對中國的經濟利益與對美國的安全關係之間進退維谷。儘管兩岸關係日益惡化，中國依然是台灣最大的出口市場。根據經濟部2023年的數據，中國佔台灣總出口的35.2％—這已是近21年來的新低，較2022年減少了18.1％。

The semiconductor sector underscores the depth of these ties even more. The Ministry of Finance reports that in 2023, Taiwan exported $166.6 billion worth of integrated circuits, which represented 38.5% of its total export value. Of these semiconductor exports, 54.2%, or $90.4 billion, were directed towards China. Given the substantial scale of semiconductor trade, it would be inconceivable for Taiwan to abruptly sever these economic ties with China.

兩岸貿易的經濟利益在半導體產業更為突出。財政部的報告顯示，2023年台灣出口的半導體價值達到1666億美元，占總出口值的38.5％。其中，有54.2％，即904億美元的半導體，出口銷往中國。半導體貿易的巨大規模，讓我們幾乎難以想象台灣突然切斷與中國經濟連結的可能性。

However, with China’s persistent military intimidation in recent years, Taiwan’s economic prosperity has become increasingly dependent on the security commitments provided by the U.S. as its strategic partner. This interdependence introduces a profound dilemma: as the U.S. works to harmonize global policies on chip exports, Taiwan stands at a crucial juncture. Taiwanese policymakers are now faced with a challenging decision—whether to align more closely with U.S. policy directives, potentially at the expense of its significant economic interests with China.

然而，隨著中國近年來持續的軍事威脅，台灣經濟的繁榮越來越仰賴美國作為其戰略夥伴提供的安全保障。這種依賴關係帶來一個深層的矛盾：我們是否應該更緊密地配合美國協調全球晶片出口的政策，即便這可能會犧牲與中國的重要經濟利益。

To further complicate matters, the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan has long been characterized by “strategic ambiguity”—a policy that deliberately leaves uncertain the extent of U.S. intervention in the event of a cross-strait conflict. Initiated as a diplomatic strategy following the termination of formal relations with Taiwan in 1979, this policy aims to deter both Taiwanese moves toward independence and Chinese military aggression. But it does so at the cost of leaving Taiwan in a perpetual state of uncertainty about the reliability of its most critical alliance. An aggressive China casts long shadows, under which the steadfastness of U.S. support remains an unanswered question.

更複雜的是，美國對台灣的安全承諾長期以來採取的是「戰略模糊」政策——即有意模糊美國在台海衝突中可能的干預程度。該政策始於1979年美國與台灣終止正式外交關係後，其目的為同時阻止台灣推動獨立和中國的軍事侵略。然而，這也使台灣無法確定其最關鍵盟友的可靠性。在中國日益咄咄逼人的態勢下，美國的穩定支持依然是個未知數，在台灣的未來蒙上陰影。

With China’s military drills targeting Taiwan becoming a daily occurrence, the approach that once appeared effective now faces mounting criticism. Gone are the days when ambiguity could easily balance competing interests, as regional tensions demand clearer policy signals.

隨著中國針對台灣的軍事演習成為常態，曾經看似有效的「戰略模糊」政策如今面臨越來越多的批評。過去那種依靠模糊政策來平衡各方利益的日子已經過去，當前的區域緊張局勢需要更明確的政策信號。

Under the Biden administration, the policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan has indeed begun to relax. In 2022, Biden himself made a clear departure from previous ambiguities by unequivocally stating that the U.S. would use military force to defend Taiwan if it were attacked by China. However, a more fundamental variable affecting U.S. policy toward Taiwan is the American electoral cycle, which tends to exacerbate policy inconsistencies during presidential transitions and shifts in party control. Contrasting Biden’s supportive stance, for instance, former President Trump recently criticized Taiwan, accusing it of exploiting the U.S. semiconductor industry and should pay for its own defense. 

在拜登政府任內，對台戰略模糊的政策確實開始有所轉圜。2022年，拜登本人明確表態，稱如果中國攻擊台灣，美國將使用武力保衛台灣，這與以往的模糊政策形成了鮮明對比。然而，美國的選舉週期也是影響美國對台政策的重要變數，總統過渡和政黨輪替往往會加劇政策的不確定性。例如，與拜登的支持台灣的立場形成對比的是前總統川普。他最近批評台灣破壞美國的半導體產業，並表示台灣應該為自己的國家安全買單。

缺乏國際地位 Complications From Taiwan’s Lack of International Standing

Perhaps the most immediate challenge facing Taiwan is its exclusion from multilateral coordination in global semiconductor policy decision-making. Despite calls for a more active role in shaping global supply chain policies, progress for Taiwan has been limited.

或許台灣當前面臨最直接的挑戰之一，是其未能參與全球半導體政策決策的多邊機制。儘管台灣一直被呼籲在全球供應鏈政策制定中扮演更積極的角色，進展卻十分有限。

For instance, the recent assembly of the G7 Semiconductors Point of Contact Group in September 2024 is a concerted effort by major global powers to coordinate semiconductor-related R&D and crisis management. The relevance of these matters to Taiwan goes without saying. Yet, Taiwan lacks a formal channel to participate in these crucial discussions.

以2024年9月召開的G7半導體聯絡小組會議為例，這場會議是全球主要強國為協調半導體相關研發及危機管理而進行的合作。這些議題與台灣息息相關，但台灣卻缺乏參與此類關鍵討論的正式管道。

This kind of exclusion not only appears strategically misguided but also fuels domestic skepticism in Taiwan about Western intentions to undermine its competitive edge in semiconductors. Such anxiety had already been heightened by earlier U.S. pressure on TSMC to diversify its manufacturing, with the company also expanding its operations in Japan and Germany. The potential partition of TSMC’s operations is increasingly seen not merely as a conjecture but as an imminent reality.

這種孤立不僅在戰略上顯得誤判，更加劇台灣國內對西方的不信任，擔心西方試圖削弱台灣在半導體領域的競爭優勢。這種質疑早在美國向台積電施壓要求分散產線，以致台積電將部分產能至日本及德國時更加惡化。台積電產線從台灣出走，如今已不再只是猜測，而是日益逼近的現實。

The reason for the half-hearted response to Taiwan’s push for more proactive engagement in global semiconductor policy is not difficult to grasp. Western diplomatic reticence toward Taiwan often rests on the assumption that Taiwanese policymakers, regardless of the West’s actions, will never gravitate towards China, resulting in a one-sided expectation of allegiance.

西方國家對於台灣要求積極參與全球半導體政策制定的冷淡回應，其原因並不難理解。西方對台灣的科技外交政策，往往基於這樣的假設：無論西方國家的決策為何，台灣政府都不會轉而向中國傾斜。這導致一種單方面的忠誠期望。

Nonetheless, the power of Taiwan’s anti-China nationalist rhetoric must be treated with caution, nor should Taiwanese policymakers let the current global momentum cloud their judgment. The stark fact is that Hsinchu, known as Taiwan’s Silicon Valley, has never been a stronghold for the Democratic Progressive Party, the current ruling party that advocates for independence.

儘管台灣的反中民族主義具有一定影響力，但必須謹慎對待。台灣的政策制定者也不應讓當前全球的順風局勢影響其判斷力。一個鮮明的事實是，被譽為「台灣矽谷」的新竹，從未是目前執政黨的堡壘。

One must not forget that Taiwan’s success in the semiconductor industry is one of globalization’s finest achievements. It has developed alongside, but never fully intertwined with, the island’s bumpy transition to democracy. While critical to Taiwan’s economic future, the semiconductor industry does not inherently carry the ideological weight often projected onto it.

不可忽視的是，台灣在半導體產業的成功是全球化的最佳範例之一。半導體業隨著台灣的經濟發展壯大，但從未與島內坎坷的民主轉型完全交織在一起。儘管半導體產業對台灣的未來經濟命脈極為重要，但其本身並不當然承載那些意識形態重擔。

該篇投書刊登於《外交家》，原文標題：Taiwan’s Semiconductor Export Conundrum