On July 21, the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET) hosted a 9-member delegation of American scholars. The visiting scholars brought expertise spanning Chinese naval strategy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organization, and China’s AI strategy. The two sides exchanged views on critical issues including contingency strategies for a potential Taiwan Strait blockade or quarantine scenario, unmanned vehicle development, and China’s AI progress.
Addressing questions regarding China’s maritime blockade and quarantine tactics and Taiwan’s potential responses, Tsaiying Lu, Director of the Energy Security and Climate Resilience Research Program at DSET, analyzed that recent Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) operations near Taiwan fall into two main modes: first, deploying vessels under 1,000 tons to intrude into waters around Kinmen and Matsu, which, according to Taiwan Coast Guard Administration (CGA) data, occur roughly four times a month averaging two hours per session; second, coordinating with the Chinese Navy during drills targeting Taiwan to simulate “law enforcement patrols” and inspections on surrounding vessels. However, Lu pointed out that sustaining a prolonged blockade or quarantine across the vast waters surrounding Taiwan presents significant challenges for China, including fleet capacity and logistical resupply constraints, making it far less easy to execute than China claims.
Regarding energy security estimates under a blockade or quarantine scenario, Lu noted a widespread public misconception that “Taiwan’s energy reserves would only last 11 to 14 days during a blockade,” emphasizing that this estimate overlooks the Taiwanese government’s energy contingency plans. She explained that while Taiwan’s Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) reserve currently stands at approximately 11 days—and is projected to reach 14 days next year—data simulations indicate that if LNG imports are disrupted, Taiwan can extend its power supply days by utilizing backup coal-fired units and renewable energy, combined with demand-side management and power rationing measures. Under crisis conditions, reducing electricity demand to 60% of normal levels would allow stored energy to sustain operations for approximately 46.2 days; under more severe conditions, further cutting demand to one-third would enable self-sufficient power supply for several months, according to evaluations.
Addressing interest in Taiwan’s unmanned vehicle industry development, DSET noted that Taiwan’s drone industry has developed rapidly over the past three years, exporting extensively to Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, and other regions. However, current export models are mostly small, short-range drones with an average flight range of only 5 to 6 kilometers. Taiwan still needs to expand its capacity for medium- and long-range drones to create a “Hellscape” across the 180-kilometer-wide Taiwan Strait to deter Chinese cross-strait invasion forces; the drone budget currently under review in the Legislative Yuan is vital for expanding this capacity.
In response to queries regarding Taiwan’s maritime unmanned systems deployment, DSET’s National Security Research Program highlighted that while the Ministry of National Defense has proposed a budget to procure 1,320 suicide Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), the proposal continues to face legislative review delays. Meanwhile, the CGA has finalized procurement for 25 USVs and 2 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). These will be deployed in the waters of Kinmen and Matsu to counter CCG vessels, aiming to strengthen response capabilities against CCG gray-zone law enforcement in the Kinmen-Matsu area while enhancing undersea cable security patrols and underwater evidence collection.
Additionally, the delegation expressed keen interest in DSET’s report published this year, “Distillation Cascade”: How China’s AI Capabilities Form, Spread, and Escape Export Controls.” In response to their inquiries, Yun-Ting Cai, Director of the Democratic Governance Research Program, pointed out that Chinese entities are currently using commercial proxy hubs in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore, to bypass KYC (Know Your Customer) identity verification with fake credentials, gaining large-scale access to advanced Western models like Anthropic. Cai suggested that U.S. policymakers focus on enhancing the monitoring of data traffic in emerging Southeast Asian data centers, with particular vigilance toward token brokers and black-market reselling.
The delegation included Brian Fonseca, Director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University; Kenneth G. Kuper, Director of the Pacific Center for Island Security; Scott McDonald, Assistant Professor at the University of North Georgia; Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute; Kal Raustiala, Professor at University of California, Los Angeles; and Denny Roy, Senior Fellow at the East-West Center. DSET expressed its gratitude to the delegation for their close attention to Taiwan’s maritime and energy security.
