The energy resilience panel of the DSET 2026 Forum──National Strategic Summit on Supply Chain Resilience was moderated by Tsaiying Lu, Director of DSET’s Energy Security and Climate Resilience Program, and focused on Taiwan’s energy security and resilience in the event of a potential maritime blockade or quarantine. The panel featured Mark Cancian, Senior Adviser in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS; Tomohisa Takei, Senior Fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation; Anton Antonenko, Vice President and Co-Founder of Dixi Group; and Taiwan Power Company (TPC) Vice President Wu Chin-Chung.
Dr. Lu discussed Taiwan’s energy security under potential blockade scenarios and drew lessons from Ukraine’s wartime experience. She argued that China’s military exercises around Taiwan since 2022 may serve as signals or rehearsals for a future blockade aimed at exhausting Taiwan’s energy supplies.
While public discussions often emphasize Taiwan’s limited LNG reserves of around 11–12 days, Dr. Lu stressed that this does not reflect Taiwan’s actual resilience. According to the previous remark by the Chairman of TPC, under emergency scenarios power demand could be cut to one third compared to peak summer usage, lowering total electricity demand. This reduced demand, in coordination with fuel switching, coal-fired generation, renewable energy, and other emergency response measures, could enable Taiwan to maintain self sufficiency for months.
She also highlighted the global implications of a blockade. The Taiwan Strait is one of the world’s busiest shipping routes, with more than 1,400 cargo vessels passing through daily. Even short military exercises have caused shipping delays, increased costs, and disruptions to LNG deliveries for other countries. Dr. Lu concluded that a Taiwan blockade would not only affect Taiwan but also regional trade, energy security, and global supply chains, making it a challenge that requires both domestic preparedness and international cooperation.
Mark Cancian, Senior Advisor of the Defense and Security Department at CSIS presented findings from his team’s Lights Out report, an independent wargame series that simulated a Chinese blockade of Taiwan 26 times under different conditions. Using publicly available data from Taiwan Power Company, the research team modeled Taiwan’s energy system, shipping flows, and economic activity to assess the effects of a prolonged blockade.
The simulations found that Taiwan could maintain normal electricity generation during the first two weeks under a full blockade. However, once LNG supplies were depleted, electricity production would gradually decline, leading to industrial power rationing and restrictions on household consumption. Coal reserves would eventually be exhausted as well, further reducing available power. Food shortages, however, were not identified as a major concern due to Taiwan’s domestic production capacity and existing inventories.
Based on these findings, Cancian recommended strengthening Taiwan’s maritime resilience by preparing commercial shipping and convoy arrangements in advance, ensuring closer cooperation between government and shipping companies during crises. He also emphasized the need to expand energy infrastructure, including storage facilities and reserve capacity.
Drawing comparisons to the Strait of Hormuz, Cancian argued that blockades are difficult to sustain indefinitely. Although military powers may possess the capability to break a blockade, political leaders often hesitate due to the risk of escalation and casualties. Therefore, improving Taiwan’s self-sufficiency and resilience before a crisis occurs is critical.
Tomohisa Takei, Senior Fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and former Chief of Staff of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, presented findings from a series of war games examining potential Taiwan contingency scenarios. Since 2021, the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies has conducted four simulations exploring how China might isolate Taiwan and deter external intervention. The exercises assumed that Beijing would initially rely on non-military means to create favorable conditions before escalating to armed conflict if Taiwan resisted.
Takei emphasized that Taiwan and Japan share similar strategic vulnerabilities as densely populated island economies dependent on overseas trade. In a crisis, China would likely target maritime supply routes, placing pressure on both countries’ energy supplies, economic activity, and critical industries. For Taiwan, disruptions to sea lines of communication would have particularly severe consequences for energy security and the semiconductor sector.
The simulations highlighted the importance of protecting maritime traffic and reducing dependence on vulnerable supply chains. One notable finding was that nuclear energy can strengthen national resilience by reducing reliance on imported fuels. Takei noted that Japan has increasingly recognized this reality and is incorporating greater energy resilience, including nuclear power and cooperation with allies, into its strategic planning.
He concluded that Taiwan should begin preparing for potential crises during peacetime by strengthening industrial mobilization mechanisms, developing rationing systems, improving coordination with the private sector, and enhancing maritime protection capabilities. Resilience, he argued, must be built before a crisis occurs rather than after vulnerabilities are exposed.
Anton Antonenko, Co-founder and Vice President of Ukraine’s Dixi Group, shared lessons from Ukraine’s experience of energy warfare. He emphasized that Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector began long before the full-scale invasion in 2022 and evolved through multiple phases, including strikes on fuel logistics, power generation facilities, and civilian infrastructure. A key lesson is that energy crises are often “multi-crises,” where disruptions to electricity simultaneously affect water supply, communications, transportation, and other essential services.
Antonenko argued that highly centralized energy systems are particularly vulnerable. Large power plants and transmission corridors create critical points of failure that can leave entire regions without electricity. As a result, Ukraine has increasingly emphasized distributed generation, regional self-sufficiency, and diversified energy sources. Renewable energy, in particular, proved relatively resilient compared to thermal and hydropower facilities, which suffered extensive damage during the war.
He also stressed the importance of flexible generation capacity, resilient transmission networks, and the protection of substations and grid infrastructure. Rather than relying solely on emergency repairs after attacks occur, governments should adopt a “resilience by design” approach, building redundancy and recovery capacity into energy systems before crises emerge. These lessons are relevant for both wartime preparedness and for strengthening long-term energy security.
He outlined the measures Taiwan has taken to strengthen energy security and power system resilience in response to growing geopolitical risks. Using the disruption of LNG supplies from Qatar during the 2026 Middle East conflict as an example, he explained that Taiwan worked closely with CPC Corporation to secure alternative fuel sources through international procurement, ensuring continued electricity generation without major disruptions.
Taiwan’s power system currently has approximately 60 GW of installed capacity, with renewable energy accounting for the largest share of capacity, followed by natural gas and coal. While natural gas remains the largest source of electricity generation, TPC aims to expand renewable energy and gradually reduce coal dependence. The company has also maintained energy stockpiles above legal requirements and retained some retired coal-fired units as emergency backup capacity.
The presentation emphasized two pillars of resilience: redundancy and response capability. TPC is developing a more distributed grid structure, expanding renewable energy, energy storage, and microgrids to reduce dependence on vulnerable transmission networks. The company has also strengthened critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, and emergency restoration capabilities through regular exercises and contingency planning.
Drawing lessons from both wartime experiences in Ukraine and Taiwan’s response to major typhoons, Vice President Wu stressed that resilience requires continuous preparation. Through infrastructure hardening, grid modernization, and coordinated emergency planning, Taipower seeks to ensure a stable and secure electricity supply even during major crises.
The audience Q&A session covered a diverse range of topics, from managing electricity demand to measures taken towards renewable energy acceleration. In particular, key questions were raised to the panelists regarding what lessons can Taiwan and the rest of the world learn from the energy disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and how China would potentially be impacted by a quarantine or blockade around Taiwan.
In response to the question on how Taiwan and other countries could learn from the Strait of Hormuz, Cancian first replied to underscore the necessity of setting up systems in advance to facilitate shipping, such as insurance mechanisms, re-flagging vessels, and communicating clearly with relevant parties on coordination measures. He mentioned one potential option was to offer crew members additional premiums to their salaries, as implemented in past CSIS war games. Antonenko reiterated the importance of insurance mechanisms, sharing that this has been an ongoing concern in the Black Sea for the last five years.
Regarding the potential negative impact on China implementing a blockade, Cancian pointed out that although China faces vulnerabilities, it may have reduced its vulnerability in recent years by expanding strategic reserves and developing alternative energy sources, making it better positioned to withstand the effects of a prolonged blockade.
Antonenko concluded the panel urging Taiwan to accelerate resilience-building efforts, emphasizing that preparedness is a continuous race against evolving threats. He also stressed the importance of integrating security into infrastructure planning and maintaining clear communication among government, military, and society during crises.
