Chiang Min-yen, Deputy Director for Economic Security at the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET), attended the 2026 Canadian Research Security Conference, Threads of Resilience: Strengthening Canada’s Capacity for Secure Global Collaboration, held in Winnipeg, Canada, from 26 to 27 May. During the conference, he shared Taiwan’s policy experience in responding to risks arising from China’s acquisition of technology and talent, academic infiltration, and transnational repression.
The conference was jointly organized by the University of Manitoba and Toronto Metropolitan University. It brought together more than one hundred research security practitioners, policy experts, research institution leaders, government funding agencies, and international partners from across Canada and beyond to examine how international research collaboration can preserve openness while safeguarding economic competitiveness and national security amid intensifying technological competition and geopolitical risk. The conference agenda addressed research security policy and practice, cross-border research collaboration, Arctic research security, defence and dual-use research, sanctions compliance, technology transfer and the commercialization of research outcomes, as well as the implications of generative artificial intelligence for research security practice.
Chiang delivered a presentation in the session entitled Research Security as Economic Security: Policy Lessons from Taiwan. He noted that, for Taiwan, research security is closely connected to economic security, national security, and democratic resilience. As a central hub in the global semiconductor supply chain, Taiwan has long faced risks of China acquiring critical technologies and technological capabilities through channels including talent recruitment, technology cooperation, industrial investment, and academic exchange. Establishing comprehensive mechanisms for identifying and mitigating these risks is therefore particularly urgent.
Chiang introduced three major components of Taiwan’s current research security framework. First, under the National Security Act, Taiwan has established legal protections for trade secrets involving National Core Critical Technologies, covering technologies whose transfer could harm national security or industrial competitiveness. Second, the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area regulates China-related appointments, technology cooperation, investment, academic exchanges, and the activities of Chinese entities in Taiwan. Third, Taiwan has developed security management mechanisms for government-funded research projects to strengthen risk governance concerning research data, personnel, partners, and the publication of research outcomes.
Drawing on cases from Taiwan, Chiang explained that China’s acquisition of Taiwanese technology and talent is not limited to the theft of confidential information. It may also occur through campus-based cooperation entities with links to Chinese authorities, the recruitment of senior researchers, the commercial transfer of publicly supported technological results, or the establishment of companies and remote-poaching arrangements in Taiwan to obtain semiconductor design capabilities. These cases demonstrate that research security governance must encompass the entire innovation ecosystem, including universities, research institutions, start-ups, and industrial supply chains.
On 27 May, Chiang also participated in the panel discussion Foreign Interference and Transnational Repression in Academia. The panel was moderated by Akshay Singh, Director of Research Security at the University of British Columbia. Other panellists included Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister and Canada’s National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator at Public Safety Canada; Sanjay Ruparelia, Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration and Jarislowsky Democracy Chair at Toronto Metropolitan University; and Megan Wood-Smith, Research Compliance Manager at the University of Bristol. The panel brought together perspectives on Canada’s counter-foreign-interference policy, democracy research, research compliance practice in the United Kingdom, and Taiwan’s experience in confronting authoritarian pressure from China.
During the discussion, Chiang stated that the risks facing Taiwan’s research community concern not only the protection of critical technologies and research outcomes, but also transnational repression and threats to academic freedom. China’s pressure on Taiwanese scholars and researchers operates through multiple channels, including political labelling, restrictions affecting professional exchange and career opportunities, threats against individuals and their families, and chilling effects generated through social and organizational networks. The common objective of these measures is to induce Taiwanese scholars to self-censor, or even remain politically silent, on issues involving Taiwan’s sovereignty, human rights, and national security.
Discussing the Chinese authorities’ published list of “diehard Taiwan independence advocates,” Chiang noted that the list currently targets political figures. However, the use of political labelling as a form of intimidation could in the future extend to scholars, researchers, or others engaged in public debate. He also shared his own experience of having received threats, underscoring that transnational repression is not an abstract risk, but a practical challenge that can directly affect researchers’ ability to participate in international exchange, publish openly, and engage in public discussion.
Chiang emphasized that the purpose of research security is not to restrict academic freedom or close off international collaboration. Rather, it is to ensure that the openness of democratic societies is not exploited by authoritarian regimes as a channel for acquiring critical technologies or silencing dissenting voices. Taiwan has long faced intersecting pressures from China across the technological, economic, and political domains. Its institutional experience can therefore offer valuable lessons for other democracies seeking to strengthen research security, economic security, and the protection of academic freedom.
