Jeremy Chih-Cheng Chang, Chief Executive Officer of the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET), together with Deputy Director Minyen Chiang and Policy Analyst Chen-An Wei of DSET’s Economic Security Program, contributed an op-ed titled “Taiwan’s Economic Security Strategy in an Era of Techno-Geopolitical Rivalry” to the latest special issue of Korea’s Trade&Security, published by the think tank Korea Institute for International Economic Policy’s Trade and Security Institute (KOSTI). The article examines how Taiwan, amid intensifying U.S.–China technology competition, global supply chain restructuring, and the rapid rise of AI, has strengthened its economic security through institutional reforms and international coordination. The authors argue that Taiwan’s strategy now stands on three mutually reinforcing pillars—Domestic Gatekeeping, Alliance Alignment, and Friend-Shoring Participation—which collectively reinforce Taiwan’s technological advantages, enhance its strategic autonomy, and secure its indispensable position in global high-tech supply chains.
The op-ed notes that advanced technologies have increasingly become strategic assets with political significance, and global interdependence is no longer merely a source of economic benefit but may also be “weaponized” as an instrument of geopolitical competition. In this environment, Taiwan—despite not being a traditional great power—holds irreplaceable advantages in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and key technologies. This unique position enables Taiwan to exercise “niche diplomacy” and greater policy autonomy, leveraging its technological indispensability as a form of strategic bargaining power within an asymmetric international landscape.
Regarding Domestic Gatekeeping, the authors highlight Taiwan’s efforts in recent years to strengthen controls over the flow of sensitive technologies, personnel, and capital. These measures include amendments to the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area to tighten vetting requirements for personnel involved in national core critical technologies; the introduction of the “national core critical technologies” framework under the National Security Act; and the 2025 amendments to the Industrial Innovation Act, which grant the government authority to block outbound investments deemed detrimental to national security. Together, these reforms constitute Taiwan’s first line of defense in safeguarding its strategic technologies.
In the area of Alliance Alignment, the op-ed notes that Taiwan has increasingly aligned its export control measures with those led by the United States, particularly as multilateral export control regimes face diminishing effectiveness. Taiwan introduced a Russia-focused high-tech export control list in 2022 that mirrors U.S. ECCN standards and, in 2025, added companies such as Huawei and SMIC to its controlled entity list. This alignment, the authors argue, enhances Taiwan’s credibility within global high-tech supply chains, prevents sensitive technologies from reaching actors that could threaten regional security, and deepens cooperation with the United States and other democratic partners.
Finally, under Friend-Shoring Participation, the op-ed highlights how Taiwan’s global semiconductor footprint—exemplified by TSMC’s investments in the United States, Europe, and Japan—has embedded Taiwan’s technological capabilities into the supply chain resilience strategies of its allies. Through generational differentiation in manufacturing technologies and policy coordination with partner governments, Taiwan maintains its most advanced semiconductor production domestically while simultaneously helping democratic partners build more resilient and trusted supply chains. The authors argue that this approach prevents Taiwan from being marginalized amid global supply chain realignments and positions it instead as a driving force for industrial security and technological resilience.
The article concludes that Taiwan’s evolving economic security strategy demonstrates the agency and autonomy a non–great power can exercise in an era defined by techno-geopolitics. The three strategic pillars reinforce one another, enabling Taiwan to remain stable and resilient amid intensifying technological competition while deepening cooperation among democratic supply chains. The authors stress that Taiwan’s role in the semiconductor and advanced technology sectors is not symbolic but foundational to global industrial security and technology governance. For the international community to build a credible, forward-looking, and secure technological cooperation framework, Taiwan’s participation must be recognized as indispensable.
