This week, TaiwanPlus reported on Taiwan’s Investigation Bureau probe into 11 Chinese companies between March 16 and 26 over suspicions that they had illegally poached talent from Taiwan’s semiconductor and other high-tech industries by setting up shell companies in Taiwan and offering high salaries to lure engineers away from science parks. The report also cited comments from Chiang Min-Yen, Deputy Director of the Economic Security Program at the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET).
According to the report, the companies under investigation include Anker Innovations, a major mobile charging device maker. As US–China technological competition continues to intensify, China is actively pursuing semiconductor self-sufficiency, while such poaching cases have become a significant risk to Taiwan’s economic and technological security. The Investigation Bureau also noted that it has handled more than 100 similar cases since the end of 2020.
Commenting on this issue, Chiang said that such cases not only reflect China’s continued efforts to absorb Taiwan’s high-tech talent and technological know-how, but also underscore Taiwan’s semiconductor industry as a key arena in the broader US–China technology rivalry.
Chiang noted that Taiwanese investigators have handled a large number of similar cases in recent years, showing that China has long targeted professional talent in Taiwan’s semiconductor design, manufacturing, and other high-tech industries through a range of channels. For China, Taiwan’s complete industrial ecosystem, mature technological capabilities, and deep pool of highly skilled talent make this more than a matter of corporate recruitment. It is also part of Beijing’s broader strategic effort to strengthen technological self-sufficiency and narrow the gap with global leaders, making the issue highly relevant to the current US–China technology rivalry.
On the common methods used in these poaching cases, Chiang explained that because Chinese capital cannot directly invest in certain sensitive industries in Taiwan, firms often operate through foreign or Hong Kong capital, or even under the names of local Taiwanese individuals, to establish business operations in Taiwan. These arrangements allow them to access technology, recruit local talent, and run actual operations remotely or from outside Taiwan. Such practices make enforcement more difficult and render talent poaching more covert and systematic.
On the legal front, Chiang pointed out that Taiwan incorporated the concept of “national core critical technologies” into its economic security-related legal framework in 2022, strengthening oversight of certain sensitive technologies and personnel. However, he also cautioned that the current system still has limitations. Much of the semiconductor industry operates in the private sector and may not directly involve substantial government subsidies or fall neatly within the scope of existing regulations. As a result, current regulatory tools remain insufficient in some cases, leaving room for further refinement in both institutional design and legal mechanisms.
Chiang added that the Taiwanese government has made substantial progress in investigating such cases in recent years, demonstrating growing attention to economic security issues. But as China continues to recruit Taiwan’s key talent through increasingly covert and complex methods, the government will need not only to sustain strong law enforcement, but also to strengthen legal frameworks, industrial governance, and inter-agency coordination in order to respond more effectively to the national security and economic risks posed by high-tech talent outflows.
In August 2024, Chiang Min-Yen published a report on remote talent poaching titled “The Remote Poaching Model: How China’s Bitmain Acquired Taiwan’s Edge AI Chip Technology and Its Implications for Economic Security”. DSET will continue to monitor related cases going forward.
