A recent op-ed by Samara Duerr, Policy Analyst in the National Security Program at DSET, published in The Diplomat, draws on Ukraine’s experience in developing UAVs during the Russo-Ukrainian war to examine how Ukraine can serve simultaneously as a model, a warning, and a partner for Taiwan’s drone industry. The article argues that drones have become a central instrument in reshaping modern warfare, and that Ukraine should pursue more concrete and deeper cooperation with Taiwan. By leveraging Taiwan’s strengths in semiconductors and advanced manufacturing, such cooperation could help reduce Ukraine’s vulnerability stemming from its reliance on single-source components within its UAV supply chain.
This op-ed forms part of DSET’s 2026 research series on Taiwan’s international cooperation in the drone sector. The analysis is based on interviews with dozens of Taiwanese drone manufacturers, as well as ten Ukrainian interviewees drawn from industry, non-governmental organizations, research institutions, and former government officials, whose observations and assessments inform the findings presented.
The article notes that the Russo-Ukrainian war has vividly demonstrated the high adaptability and rapid iteration cycles of unmanned systems on the battlefield. In Ukraine, the effective lifespan of drone technologies and tactics often lasts only a matter of weeks before requiring immediate adjustment in response to adversary countermeasures. This model of battlefield feedback–driven development has enabled Ukraine to sustain operational capabilities under highly asymmetric conditions. By contrast, Taiwan’s existing defense procurement processes typically span one to three years and lack mechanisms for rapid modification, potentially limiting Taiwan’s ability to maintain an advantage in the face of coercion or aggression.
Duerr further analyzes how Ukraine, in response to immense wartime demand for UAVs and mounting supply chain risks, has gradually developed two core strategies: localization and co-production. On the one hand, Ukraine has steadily strengthened domestic assembly and key component manufacturing capabilities, with approximately 95 percent of drones now able to be finalized within Ukraine. According to surveys conducted by the Ukrainian defense cluster Tech Force in UA and the independent think tank Better Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO), 28 percent of UAV manufacturers use at least 50 percent Ukrainian-made components. On the other hand, Ukraine has partnered with countries such as Denmark and Czechia to establish production lines abroad, dispersing risk and ensuring continuity of output.
At the same time, Duerr cautions that Ukraine remains heavily dependent on external suppliers for critical inputs, including semiconductors, microelectronics, batteries, and magnets. In particular, the rare earth materials required for batteries and magnets—whose processing is long dominated by China—constitute a structural vulnerability shared by both Ukraine and Taiwan.
Although Ukraine has made progress in expanding its domestic manufacturing base, current capacity remains insufficient to meet wartime demand. Following China’s imposition of export controls on drones and related components in 2023, which drove up production costs, Ukraine has increasingly recognized the urgency of supply chain resilience. A survey conducted by the Ukrainian research organization Snake Island Institute found that nearly 77 percent of Ukrainian manufacturers indicated they would cease purchasing Chinese components if alternative materials were available at the same price.
The op-ed also outlines recent developments in Taiwan–Ukraine drone cooperation. Based on interviews conducted by DSET with sources in both Taiwan and Ukraine, the analysis finds that the majority of drones exported from Taiwan to its two largest markets—Poland and Czechia—amounting to approximately 56,000 units as of October 2025, are in practice transferred onward to Ukraine. Additional business-to-business (B2B) cooperation includes disclosures by Ukrainian defense industry entities that seven Ukrainian firms currently source UAV components from Taiwanese suppliers. These efforts are complemented by memoranda of understanding signed between Taiwan Excellence Drone International Business Opportunities Alliance (TEDIBOA) and Ukraine’s Iron Cluster, as well as between Taiwan’s Defense Industry Development Association (DIDA) and its Polish and Ukrainian counterparts.
Duerr concludes that significant room remains for expanding Taiwan–Ukraine cooperation in B2B connections, tech sharing, joint research and development. She further identifies three models of Ukraine’s cooperation with other partner countries that have not yet included Taiwan: first, cooperation with Türkiye and Germany focused on establishing subsidiaries and factories within Ukraine to produce battlefield-proven systems such as the TB2 and Vector drones; second, cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom centered on advanced technology integration, particularly the development of AI-enabled interceptor drones and the direct integration of frontline data into production lines; and third, partnerships with Denmark and Czechia to manufacture Ukrainian-designed drones abroad to secure supply chains.
In closing, the op-ed emphasizes that as Ukraine continues to phase out its reliance on Chinese drone components, it faces an urgent need for stable and trustworthy alternative suppliers. Taiwan, meanwhile, stands to benefit from Ukraine’s combat-tested experience in accelerating the maturation of its own drone industry and associated innovations. Duerr argues that the two sides exhibit strong complementarities in critical component supply, technology exchange, and joint development—areas that are also central to strengthening long-term defense autonomy.
