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Copyright © Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology.
Supervising Organization: National Science and Technology Council (Taiwan)
All content on this website, including text, images, audio-visual materials, and other multimedia, is protected by copyright law. No one may copy, repost, reproduce, or use this content in any form without explicit authorization. If you have questions or wish to use content from our website, please contact us to obtain authorization.
Copyright © Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology.
Supervising Organization: National Science and Technology Council (Taiwan)
2024 / 12 / 31
Decoding China’s Digital Offensive: An Analysis of Information Warfare Tactics in Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election
作者:Lilly Min-Chen Lee
1. Introduction
1.1 Background of the Research
The Chinese government perceives the proliferation of internet technology as a strategic threat to its authority, potentially undermining its control over information flows and public discourse.[i] In response, Beijing has implemented a strategy aimed at controlling China’s digital landscape,[ii] encompassing rigorous censorship and extensive propaganda that impacts both the domestic and international spheres.[iii] This concerted effort by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to shape the online environment is critical to understanding its approach to information warfare.
Taiwan, at the forefront of China’s international influence operations, offers a critical case study of information warfare tactics deployed against a vibrant democracy. The specific tactics employed in Taiwan may provide insights into the CCP’s larger strategic patterns and methodologies. As Taiwanese voters prepared for the 2024 presidential election, they encountered a flood of posts questioning candidate competence and democratic integrity.[iv] Many of these posts, while appearing to come from concerned citizens, were part of a coordinated information warfare campaign orchestrated by state actors across the Taiwan Strait.[v] This deliberate manipulation of human decision-makers, primarily through online social media platforms, aimed to distort the epistemic and emotional perspectives of voters, thereby influencing political outcomes and public opinion.
This research investigates whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has engaged in information warfare in the 2024 Taiwan presidential election —and if so, how it is conducting this campaign. To provide clear boundaries and structure, we formulate the following sub-questions:
How has the Chinese government conducted information warfare related to the 2024 Taiwan presidential election? What specific tactics and methods has China employed in this information warfare campaign? And, which key demographic groups, political factions, or influential individuals in Taiwan have been the primary targets of these operations?
To answer these questions, this research develops the Information Warfare Toolbox framework and applies it to two case studies of Chinese information warfare in Taiwan’s domestic politics. The first examines China’s manipulation of Taiwan’s domestic egg shortage crisis, demonstrating how external actors can amplify internal political tensions through coordinated social media campaigns and state-controlled media narratives. The second analyzes the disinformation campaign surrounding Vice President Lai Ching-te’s diplomatic visit to Paraguay, revealing how Chinese state actors construct and disseminate false narratives about Taiwan’s foreign relations. We systematically apply our framework’s dimensions—including objectives, tactics, stakeholders, platforms, amplifiers, and target audiences—to each case study and analyze patterns in China’s information warfare strategies. This comparative analysis will help policymakers and researchers better understand and counter such information warfare campaigns.
1.2 Analytic Framework
Under the Information Warfare Toolbox framework —developed through a combination of research, analysis, and open-source intelligence— we studied the various ways in which the Chinese government manipulates information to achieve specific objectives. From January to December 2023, we systematically analyzed content across multiple platforms including Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), WeChat, Weibo, PTT, and Mobile01. We focused particularly on posts and articles related to Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election, examining over 1,000 social media posts, news articles, and official statements from Chinese state media outlets such as Huaxia Jingwei Network and Shenzhen Media Group, as well as the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office.
The analysis involved examining examples of censorship (such as content removals on WeChat), propaganda (through state media narratives), narrative framing (via coordinated messaging across platforms), and disinformation (through forged documents and false claims) to identify common tactics and strategies. We traced how information flowed from Chinese state media to social media platforms, documenting the timing, messaging patterns, and amplification networks. The content was collected in both Chinese and English to capture the full scope of information operations targeting Taiwanese and international audiences. The gathered information was then cataloged into different dimensions based on their relevance and importance in understanding the Chinese government’s information manipulation techniques.
2. Case Studies and Analysis of Results
2.1 Case Study of Internal Affairs – Egg Shortage Dispute
In 2023, Taiwan faced a significant egg shortage that led to price increases of up to 30-40 percent[vi] in some areas. As Taiwan approached its 2024 presidential election, this crisis quickly became a focal point of political discourse, with the opposition parties using it to question the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s governing capabilities. The timing of the crisis, particularly its peak between July and September 2023, coincided with the early stages of the presidential campaign, allowing China to amplify domestic criticisms through state media outlets and social media campaigns. The government’s decision to import eggs from countries like Australia and Thailand, while refusing imports from China, sparked intense debate about food security and agricultural policy. This issue influenced voter sentiment —as demonstrated by the resignation of Agriculture Minister Chen Chi-chung in September 2023 amid public pressure— and became a key talking point in the opposition parties’ campaign messaging about the DPP’s economic mismanagement.[vii]
The information campaign developed through a complex interplay of domestic and external actors. Initial criticisms from Taiwan’s opposition parties, particularly the Kuomintang, were quickly amplified and manipulated by Chinese state-owned media outlets. Key players in this amplification included Huaxia Jingwei Network, Shenzhen Media Group, and Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council.
The campaign unfolded in two main waves:
A timeline analysis reveals the coordinated nature of the campaign:
The involvement of the Huaxia Jingwei Network was noteworthy. Recognized for its connections to Chinese state media, it operates as a subsidiary of Huaxia Jingwei Information Technology Co. Its chairman, Xing Yunming, a major general of the People’s Liberation Army and member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, played a crucial role in this narrative.[xx] His background and the network’s media influence are significant in understanding the dynamics of information warfare and their impact on Taiwan’s political discourse. [xxi] [xxii]
Applying the Information Warfare Toolbox reveals an orchestrated attempt to discredit the Tsai administration through narrative framing. The campaign’s objective was to portray the government’s crisis response as inadequate, mainly by spreading disparaging narratives through social media. Key stakeholders included local opposition parties and Chinese state-affiliated media organizations. Facebook served as the primary platform for promoting these narratives, targeting both Taiwanese citizens and the global Chinese-speaking community.
2.2 Case Study of Foreign Affairs: Vice President Lai’s Paraguay “Scandal”
On August 15, 2023, Taiwan’s Vice President Lai Ching-te attended the inauguration of President Santiago Peña Palacios of the Republic of Paraguay. Prior to his visit, a disinformation campaign had already begun. It started with anonymous accounts on Endchan, an anonymous imageboard, releasing forged Spanish documents alleging “Paraguay is a colony of Spain, and Taiwan has provided US$4.8 million in aid to Paraguay.” These were then strategically shared by X accounts @chow7711 and @GaylaFranklin8. The disinformation was further amplified by actors linked to Taiwan’s You Zhibin, the New Party’s candidate for the 2024 Legislative Yuan election[xxiii] and Chinese state media. They claimed that “the Taiwan-Paraguay University of Science and Technology is a shell institution” and accused Lai of “squandering US$4.8 million on Paraguay.”[xxiv]
A timeline analysis reveals the coordinated nature of the campaign:
It is important to note that Sing Tao Daily,[xxxiii] Bastille Post,[xxxiv] Guancha News,[xxxv] and Takung Pao[xxxvi] have all been reported as state-affiliated and are considered mouthpieces of the CCP in Hong Kong. Applying the Information Warfare Toolbox to this disinformation campaign highlights a deliberate effort to tarnish the reputation of Taiwan’s diplomacy. The aim was to portray the Taiwanese government as engaging in “dollar diplomacy,” a diplomatic practice of using economic aid and investment to gain international political support and recognition. In Taiwan’s case, this term is often used pejoratively by Chinese state media to characterize Taiwan’s foreign aid and development programs as attempts to “buy” diplomatic allies through wasteful spending, particularly given the ongoing competition between China and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. Central to this scheme were anonymous online entities, opposition party affiliates, and Chinese state media outlets. Key platforms like Endchan and X served as the initial medium for disseminating these claims, which were then echoed by recognized media organizations considered mouthpieces of the CCP in Hong Kong. This narrative was strategically amplified to reach and influence the perceptions of the Taiwanese populace and the international Chinese-speaking community.
3. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The Information Warfare Toolbox fills a crucial gap in existing research, offering a structured framework to untangle the complex web of information manipulation. By sharply defining these dimensions, we’ve created a powerful lens for researchers and policymakers. They can now spot patterns, track evolving tactics, and craft targeted defenses with greater precision. The two case studies show how Beijing adeptly exploits domestic issues and manipulates foreign policy narratives to shape public opinion. While our analysis focuses on China’s information warfare tactics in Taiwan, similar frameworks can be applied to understand information operations by other state actors. Russia’s interference in democratic elections worldwide has demonstrated comparable sophisticated use of social media platforms to amplify domestic divisions and spread disinformation.
The framework’s relevance is particularly acute given contemporary patterns of news consumption. With social media platforms becoming primary news sources for many citizens, especially during elections, the potential impact of coordinated information operations has grown exponentially. The 2024 election cycle, with major democratic contests occurring across multiple continents, presents unprecedented opportunities for information warfare through these channels. Traditional election interference through direct manipulation of voting systems has largely given way to more subtle influence operations targeting voters’ information environment months or even years before they cast their ballots.
These findings underscore the urgent need for a coordinated, international response to safeguard democratic institutions against such sophisticated information warfare. The framework provides a systematic approach to understanding these threats, particularly the ways authoritarian states can work in concert to amplify disinformation. This understanding enables more effective defensive strategies that can be adapted and applied across different national contexts and political systems, especially in combating coordinated cross-state influence operations.
Policymakers face two key challenges in addressing China’s information warfare: first, to anticipate and counter information campaigns before they’re conducted; and, second, to safeguard democratic processes and institutions against sophisticated manipulation tactics. To tackle these challenges, we propose the following recommendations:
Endnotes
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