Decoding China’s Digital Offensive: An Analysis of Information Warfare Tactics in Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election

1.     Introduction

1.1  Background of the Research

The Chinese government perceives the proliferation of internet technology as a strategic threat to its authority, potentially undermining its control over information flows and public discourse.[i] In response, Beijing has implemented a strategy aimed at controlling China’s digital landscape,[ii] encompassing rigorous censorship and extensive propaganda that impacts both the domestic and international spheres.[iii] This concerted effort by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to shape the online environment is critical to understanding its approach to information warfare.

Taiwan, at the forefront of China’s international influence operations, offers a critical case study of information warfare tactics deployed against a vibrant democracy. The specific tactics employed in Taiwan may provide insights into the CCP’s larger strategic patterns and methodologies. As Taiwanese voters prepared for the 2024 presidential election, they encountered a flood of posts questioning candidate competence and democratic integrity.[iv] Many of these posts, while appearing to come from concerned citizens, were part of a coordinated information warfare campaign orchestrated by state actors across the Taiwan Strait.[v] This deliberate manipulation of human decision-makers, primarily through online social media platforms, aimed to distort the epistemic and emotional perspectives of voters, thereby influencing political outcomes and public opinion.

This research investigates whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has engaged in information warfare in the 2024 Taiwan presidential election —and if so, how it is conducting this campaign.  To provide clear boundaries and structure, we formulate the following sub-questions:

How has the Chinese government conducted information warfare related to the 2024 Taiwan presidential election?  What specific tactics and methods has China employed in this information warfare campaign? And, which key demographic groups, political factions, or influential individuals in Taiwan have been the primary targets of these operations?

To answer these questions, this research develops the Information Warfare Toolbox framework and applies it to two case studies of Chinese information warfare in Taiwan’s domestic politics. The first examines China’s manipulation of Taiwan’s domestic egg shortage crisis, demonstrating how external actors can amplify internal political tensions through coordinated social media campaigns and state-controlled media narratives. The second analyzes the disinformation campaign surrounding Vice President Lai Ching-te’s diplomatic visit to Paraguay, revealing how Chinese state actors construct and disseminate false narratives about Taiwan’s foreign relations. We systematically apply our framework’s dimensions—including objectives, tactics, stakeholders, platforms, amplifiers, and target audiences—to each case study and analyze patterns in China’s information warfare strategies. This comparative analysis will help policymakers and researchers better understand and counter such information warfare campaigns.

1.2  Analytic Framework

Under the Information Warfare Toolbox framework —developed through a combination of research, analysis, and open-source intelligence— we studied the various ways in which the Chinese government manipulates information to achieve specific objectives. From January to December 2023, we systematically analyzed content across multiple platforms including Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), WeChat, Weibo, PTT, and Mobile01. We focused particularly on posts and articles related to Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election, examining over 1,000 social media posts, news articles, and official statements from Chinese state media outlets such as Huaxia Jingwei Network and Shenzhen Media Group, as well as the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office.

The analysis involved examining examples of censorship (such as content removals on WeChat), propaganda (through state media narratives), narrative framing (via coordinated messaging across platforms), and disinformation (through forged documents and false claims) to identify common tactics and strategies. We traced how information flowed from Chinese state media to social media platforms, documenting the timing, messaging patterns, and amplification networks. The content was collected in both Chinese and English to capture the full scope of information operations targeting Taiwanese and international audiences. The gathered information was then cataloged into different dimensions based on their relevance and importance in understanding the Chinese government’s information manipulation techniques. 

2.     Case Studies and Analysis of Results

2.1 Case Study of Internal Affairs – Egg Shortage Dispute

In 2023, Taiwan faced a significant egg shortage that led to price increases of up to 30-40 percent[vi] in some areas. As Taiwan approached its 2024 presidential election, this crisis quickly became a focal point of political discourse, with the opposition parties using it to question the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s governing capabilities. The timing of the crisis, particularly its peak between July and September 2023, coincided with the early stages of the presidential campaign, allowing China to amplify domestic criticisms through state media outlets and social media campaigns. The government’s decision to import eggs from countries like Australia and Thailand, while refusing imports from China, sparked intense debate about food security and agricultural policy. This issue influenced voter sentiment —as demonstrated by the resignation of Agriculture Minister Chen Chi-chung in September 2023 amid public pressure— and became a key talking point in the opposition parties’ campaign messaging about the DPP’s economic mismanagement.[vii]

The information campaign developed through a complex interplay of domestic and external actors. Initial criticisms from Taiwan’s opposition parties, particularly the Kuomintang, were quickly amplified and manipulated by Chinese state-owned media outlets. Key players in this amplification included Huaxia Jingwei Network, Shenzhen Media Group, and Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council.

The campaign unfolded in two main waves:

1. July 2023: Initiated by Facebook fan page “Politicians Are Pleased.”[viii]  The content was further amplified by Huaxia Jingwei Network[ix], a state-affiliated media platform specializing in Taiwan-related content.  Huaxia Jingwei Network promulgated the content among domestic Chinese audiences and overseas Chinese communities.
2. September 2023: Launched by the Facebook page “Zhi News”[x] (previously known as Shenzhen Media Group)[xi] and further amplified by Zhu Fenglian[xii] and other Chinese state-controlled media and affiliated fan pages. [xiii]

A timeline analysis reveals the coordinated nature of the campaign:

• July 30, 2023: The anti-DPP Facebook fan page “Politicians Are Pleased” initiated a campaign and disseminated content to other political Facebook groups, criticizing Chen Chi-chung, then-Minister of Agriculture, for his agricultural policies and the administration’s handling of the egg shortage crisis.  The page claimed that Chen Chi-chung was undeservedly promoted to minister of Agriculture, after having plunged Taiwan’s agricultural exports into negative growth since becoming head of the Council of Agriculture in 2019. This claim misrepresented Taiwan’s agricultural trade data —in fact, according to Taiwan’s Council of Agriculture statistics, the country’s agricultural exports in grew from US$5.47 billion in 2019 to US$5.78 billion in 2022 under Chen Chi-chung. The disinformation campaign deliberately distorted these figures by selectively focusing on temporary monthly declines while ignoring the overall upward trend. The post implied that his mismanagement contributed to the egg shortage and questioned his competence in handling agricultural crises. These claims were then circulated across multiple political Facebook groups, including “Han Kuo-yu’s Think Tank,” “Tsai Ing-wen’s Rights and Wrongs,” and “Public Outrage Daily,” magnifying criticism of the administration’s food security policies.”[xiv]
• August 1, 2023: The Chinese-affiliated official media Huaxia Jingwei[xv] propagated a narrative criticizing Chen Chi-chung’s performance concerning Taiwan’s agricultural exports and his subsequent promotion as minister of Agriculture.[xvi]
• September 13, 2023: Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office,
• remarked at a Taiwan Affairs Office press conference that the DPP’s corruption[xvii] and incompetence were the fundamental reasons behind Taiwan’s egg shortage crisis.[xviii] The Taiwan Affairs Office then disseminated this message through various channels—notably through their press release on People’s Daily and coordinated posts on Facebook pages including “Tian Tian,” “Zhi Xing,” and “Cross-Strait.” The statement specifically criticized the Tsai administration’s refusal to import eggs from mainland China amid a domestic shortage, framing this as evidence of the DPP’s prioritizing political ideology over citizens’ well-being.”
• September 27, 2023: The Facebook page “Zhi News,” affiliated with the Chinese government media, posted a video saying “The resignation of Chen Chi-chung, Taiwan’s Agriculture Department head, amid an egg shortage crisis, has highlighted concerns about the DPP’s governing capabilities.”[xix]

The involvement of the Huaxia Jingwei Network was noteworthy. Recognized for its connections to Chinese state media, it operates as a subsidiary of Huaxia Jingwei Information Technology Co. Its chairman, Xing Yunming, a major general of the People’s Liberation Army and member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, played a crucial role in this narrative.[xx] His background and the network’s media influence are significant in understanding the dynamics of information warfare and their impact on Taiwan’s political discourse. [xxi] [xxii]

Applying the Information Warfare Toolbox reveals an orchestrated attempt to discredit the Tsai administration through narrative framing. The campaign’s objective was to portray the government’s crisis response as inadequate, mainly by spreading disparaging narratives through social media. Key stakeholders included local opposition parties and Chinese state-affiliated media organizations. Facebook served as the primary platform for promoting these narratives, targeting both Taiwanese citizens and the global Chinese-speaking community.

2.2  Case Study of Foreign Affairs: Vice President Lai’s Paraguay “Scandal”

On August 15, 2023, Taiwan’s Vice President Lai Ching-te attended the inauguration of President Santiago Peña Palacios of the Republic of Paraguay. Prior to his visit, a disinformation campaign had already begun. It started with anonymous accounts on Endchan, an anonymous imageboard, releasing forged Spanish documents alleging “Paraguay is a colony of Spain, and Taiwan has provided US$4.8 million in aid to Paraguay.” These were then strategically shared by X accounts @chow7711 and @GaylaFranklin8. The disinformation was further amplified by actors linked to Taiwan’s  You Zhibin, the New Party’s candidate for the 2024 Legislative Yuan election[xxiii] and Chinese state media. They claimed that “the Taiwan-Paraguay University of Science and Technology is a shell institution” and accused Lai of “squandering US$4.8 million on Paraguay.”[xxiv]

A timeline analysis reveals the coordinated nature of the campaign:

• August 13, 2023: Anonymous accounts on Endchan released forged Spanish documents. [xxv]
• August 14, 2023: The forged documents were circulated on X by @chow7711 and several synchronized fake accounts. [xxvi]
• August 15, 2023: The disinformation, boosted by You Zhibin, the New Party’s candidate for the 2024 Legislative Yuan election, spread further through anonymous contributors on Mobile01 and PTT. [xxvii]
• August 16, 2023: The X post by @chow7711 was amplified by the Hong Kong Rule of Law Report. [xxviii]
• September 6-7, 2023: Sing Tao Daily, [xxix] Bastille Post, [xxx] and Guancha News[xxxi] reported on the story.
• September 10, 2023: Takung Pao reported on “Taiwan’s support in constructing a university in Paraguay leads to the uncovering of a ‘shell’ scandal,” [xxxii] along with news of “Tsai Ing-wen’s ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ scandal.”

It is important to note that Sing Tao Daily,[xxxiii] Bastille Post,[xxxiv] Guancha News,[xxxv] and Takung Pao[xxxvi] have all been reported as state-affiliated and are considered mouthpieces of the CCP in Hong Kong. Applying the Information Warfare Toolbox to this disinformation campaign highlights a deliberate effort to tarnish the reputation of Taiwan’s diplomacy. The aim was to portray the Taiwanese government as engaging in “dollar diplomacy,” a diplomatic practice of using economic aid and investment to gain international political support and recognition. In Taiwan’s case, this term is often used pejoratively by Chinese state media to characterize Taiwan’s foreign aid and development programs as attempts to “buy” diplomatic allies through wasteful spending, particularly given the ongoing competition between China and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. Central to this scheme were anonymous online entities, opposition party affiliates, and Chinese state media outlets. Key platforms like Endchan and X served as the initial medium for disseminating these claims, which were then echoed by recognized media organizations considered mouthpieces of the CCP in Hong Kong. This narrative was strategically amplified to reach and influence the perceptions of the Taiwanese populace and the international Chinese-speaking community.

3.     Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

The Information Warfare Toolbox fills a crucial gap in existing research, offering a structured framework to untangle the complex web of information manipulation. By sharply defining these dimensions, we’ve created a powerful lens for researchers and policymakers. They can now spot patterns, track evolving tactics, and craft targeted defenses with greater precision. The two case studies show how Beijing adeptly exploits domestic issues and manipulates foreign policy narratives to shape public opinion. While our analysis focuses on China’s information warfare tactics in Taiwan, similar frameworks can be applied to understand information operations by other state actors. Russia’s interference in democratic elections worldwide has demonstrated comparable sophisticated use of social media platforms to amplify domestic divisions and spread disinformation.

The framework’s relevance is particularly acute given contemporary patterns of news consumption. With social media platforms becoming primary news sources for many citizens, especially during elections, the potential impact of coordinated information operations has grown exponentially. The 2024 election cycle, with major democratic contests occurring across multiple continents, presents unprecedented opportunities for information warfare through these channels. Traditional election interference through direct manipulation of voting systems has largely given way to more subtle influence operations targeting voters’ information environment months or even years before they cast their ballots.

These findings underscore the urgent need for a coordinated, international response to safeguard democratic institutions against such sophisticated information warfare. The framework provides a systematic approach to understanding these threats, particularly the ways authoritarian states can work in concert to amplify disinformation. This understanding enables more effective defensive strategies that can be adapted and applied across different national contexts and political systems, especially in combating coordinated cross-state influence operations.

Policymakers face two key challenges in addressing China’s information warfare: first, to anticipate and counter information campaigns before they’re conducted; and,  second, to safeguard democratic processes and institutions against sophisticated manipulation tactics. To tackle these challenges, we propose the following recommendations:

1. At the international level, we recommend establishing an Information Integrity Task Force to facilitate information sharing, coordinate responses among democratic nations, and develop early warning systems for detecting emerging disinformation trends. This task force could build upon existing models like the European Union’s Rapid Alert System, which allows EU member states to share insights on disinformation campaigns in real time. This task force should complement efforts to foster broader international cooperation on information integrity. It could also develop common definitions and frameworks for identifying and categorizing information warfare tactics while establishing norms and best practices that balance countering disinformation with preserving freedom of speech.
2. On the domestic front, governments should implement comprehensive digital literacy programs, integrating critical thinking and media literacy curricula at all educational levels to equip citizens with the skills to recognize and resist information manipulation tactics. These efforts should be complemented by the creation of rapid response teams composed of cybersecurity experts, linguists, and regional specialists to identify and counter emerging disinformation campaigns in real time. The Czech Republic’s Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats offers a model for this, monitoring disinformation and providing swift, fact-based responses. To bolster the media ecosystem, governments should establish funding mechanisms and legal protections for independent journalism, particularly in areas vulnerable to foreign influence operations. This should be coupled with enhanced regulations on political advertising, including stricter disclosure requirements for ad sources and mechanisms to track and limit foreign financial influences in domestic political processes.
3. Social media platforms must also be held accountable through government pressure to implement more stringent content moderation and fact-checking standards, especially for political content. Platforms should be required to provide regular, detailed reports on disinformation trends and mitigation efforts, focusing on identifying and countering state-sponsored information campaigns. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) offers one approach, requiring social media platforms to remove illegal content within twenty-four hours of notification or face significant fines.
4. Democratic governments and international organizations should provide funding and resources to empower civil society organizations focused on fact-checking and disinformation research. These efforts should be complemented by facilitating partnerships between academia, non-government organizations, and government agencies to leverage diverse expertise in combating information warfare. The Taiwan Fact Check Center is an example of this approach, operating as an independent, non-partisan organization that collaborates with academic institutions, media outlets, and tech companies to verify information and educate the public.

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Endnotes

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