An analyst from the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET), together with a visiting scholar at the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, has co-authored a policy article at the Martens Centre examining structural vulnerabilities in Europe’s semiconductor supply chain. Using the case of Nexperia in the Netherlands, the article assesses the institutional challenges facing Europe’s economic security and strategic autonomy agenda.

The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, the official think tank of the European People’s Party (EPP), has long focused on European integration, industrial policy, and geopolitical developments. Titled “Strategic Autonomy Requires a Strategic Partner: Why Europe Must Expand Industrial Cooperation with Taiwan,” the article is co-authored by Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, Visiting Fellow at the Martens Centre, alongside Cathy Fang and Peter Tozzi, policy analysts in DSET’s Economic Security Research Program.

The article argues that amid intensifying geopolitical competition and the normalization of state-led industrial policies, semiconductor supply chains are no longer driven solely by efficiency considerations but have become critical infrastructure underpinning economic security and technological sovereignty. In this context, the Nexperia case highlights a structural blind spot: mature-node semiconductors—often overlooked by major markets—constitute a latent strategic vulnerability. When key supply chain nodes are highly concentrated and embedded within specific political and regulatory environments, dependencies can be transformed into geopolitical risks, undermining industrial stability.

The study further notes that Europe’s semiconductor strategy has traditionally prioritized advanced-node manufacturing and high-performance computing, while underinvesting in mature-node chips and discrete components that support core industrial sectors such as automotive and energy systems. Despite their lower margins, these components are widely embedded across industrial applications and form the backbone of supply chain resilience. Disruptions in their supply can therefore trigger systemic, cross-sector impacts.

The authors argue that European firms’ historical focus on cost optimization has led to an underestimation of geopolitical risks. The regulatory intervention and supply disruptions observed in the Nexperia case illustrate how supply chain risks can materialize into price volatility, production uncertainty, and broader supply shocks. At the policy level, while the European Chips Act has strengthened the EU’s positioning in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, its strategic approach to mature-node capacity remains insufficient.

Against this backdrop, the article emphasizes Taiwan’s role not only as a global leader in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, but also as a reliable supplier of mature-node technologies and discrete components. Taiwan has demonstrated its capacity to provide stability during past supply chain disruptions, reinforcing its position as a trusted partner.

As a like-minded democracy, Taiwan holds strategic value for Europe in building “non-red supply chains.” The authors argue that if Europe is to realize its strategic autonomy objectives, cooperation with Taiwan must be institutionalized and long-term in nature, rather than limited to ad hoc coordination during crises.

The article concludes with three policy recommendations. First, the EU should move beyond ex-post investment screening toward strengthening oversight of ownership structures and technology flows. Second, industry actors should integrate dual sourcing and second-supplier certification into core risk management strategies to reduce dependency on single sources. Third, future semiconductor policies should elevate the strategic importance of mature-node production and establish institutionalized cooperation mechanisms with Taiwan to enhance supply chain resilience.