About DSET Drone Newsletter:

DSET’s National Security Group publishes a biweekly drone newsletter. It reviews a curated selection of the most noteworthy domestic and international sources, providing insights into the development of Taiwan’s drone industry and the implications of global unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) trends for Taiwan.

Drone Highlights This Week:

  1. Experts from the CNAS x DSET panel emphasized that US–TW drone cooperation must evolve beyond aerial systems to prioritize underwater vehicles, resilience against electronic warfare, and scalable production for prolonged conflict.
  2. Effective December 1, Taiwan is implementing stricter oversight on drone imports, a move primarily targeting the 90% of imports that originate from China.
  3. Taiwan’s military has earmarked NT$9.7 billion to acquire 635 portable, vehicle-mountable anti-drone systems.
  4. In the coming two to three years, the US Army plans to procure a million drones—at a minimum. 
  5. A new FCC Report and Order states that Modular transmitters, which are used in UAV flight control and video systems, if manufactured by an entity on the FCC ‘Covered List’ will now be restricted regardless of previous authorization and will ban future approval of devices containing them.

CNAS x DSET Panel: The Importance of UUVs, Resilience Against EW, and Scalable Production

At a November 4 panel, experts from DSET and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)—one of the first US think tanks to report on US–TW drone cooperation—joined former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner to map the future of uncrewed systems. Notedly, while Ratner did not manage the ‘Replicator’ or ‘Hellscape’ programs directly, his strategic leadership of the China Task Force laid  policy groundwork for these asymmetric deterrence initiatives. Together, the group identified three critical themes for future planning: underwater uncrewed vehicles (UUVs), fiber-optic resilience against electronic warfare, and production capacity for a long war.

While the panel focused primarily on UAVs, several exchanges highlighted that UUVs will increasingly matter in Taiwan’s future defense posture. From the discussion, two points were clear:

  • UUVs can contribute meaningfully to early detection of approaching naval forces.
  • Their ability to operate discreetly makes them valuable in the maritime environment surrounding Taiwan.

Panelists also noted that UUVs need not mirror large strategic systems; smaller, more modular vehicles can play practical roles in surveillance or denial missions and can be scaled more easily. Taiwan has already begun expanding its interest from UAVs into USVs and UUVs, but as highlighted in the panel, this area remains earlier in development and would benefit from clearer pathways for testing and adoption.

Electronic warfare emerged as another key concern, with panelists emphasizing that both Taiwan and the United States must prepare for a highly contested electromagnetic environment.

From the discussion:

  • Fiber-optic drones can help bypass RF jamming but have limited applicability at sea due to weather and physical constraints.
  • Electronic warfare (EW) resilience will depend less on a single technology and more on having multiple options available.
  • Taiwan’s emphasis on scalable, lower-cost systems aligns with the need to maintain operational effectiveness even when individual drones are jammed or lost.

Panelists further stressed that commercial drones will remain important for Taiwan’s mass and adaptability, but EW vulnerabilities will require more cooperation on software updates, component choices, and counter-UAS technology.

The last recurring theme was the need to plan not just for initial operations but for a long conflict. Across the panel, several insights emerged:

  • Taiwan’s drone production has expanded rapidly, and government procurement will continue to increase.
  • Real-world exports—particularly to European partners—have already provided valuable operational feedback for domestic firms.
  • Both Taiwan and the United States face the challenge of scaling production faster than losses in a high-attrition environment.

Panelists emphasized that Taiwan’s approach—building domestic production of small drones while cooperating with the United States on larger, more complex platforms—positions it well for continued growth. However, both sides still need clearer mechanisms for synchronizing manufacturing, certification, and sustainment planning, especially under US  regulatory changes affecting non-red supply chains.

Overall, the CNAS panel highlighted that uncrewed systems will require a broad, adaptable ecosystem across air, surface, and underwater domains. For Taiwan, this means continuing to expand beyond UAVs into UUVs and USVs, strengthening resilience in contested electromagnetic environments, and developing production capacity suited for prolonged operational demand. For the United States, integrating Taiwan more deeply into production, testing, and policy planning will help both sides better respond to rising global demand for uncrewed systems. 

Together, these insights provide a clear roadmap for strengthening US–TW cooperation in the rapidly evolving unmanned systems landscape.

Taiwan Tightens Drone Import Rules, Increasing Oversight of Chinese Models

Starting December 1, Taiwan will tighten rules on drone imports. The Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Bureau of Foreign Trade announced that under the new system, importers of civilian drones must obtain approval documents from the Civil Aeronautics Administration, while those bringing in military remote-controlled drones will need separate approval from the Ministry of National Defense before customs will clear their shipments.

The ministry has added 14 types of drones to a new category with import code “617,” placing them on the customs inspection list. The rules cover most remote-controlled drones weighing between 250 grams and 150 kilograms, as well as sub-250-gram drones designed for remote flight.

Officials say the goal is to strengthen control over drone sources and align with new drone registration and inspection rules taking effect the same day. According to Taiwan’s Customs Administration, Taiwan imported 59,057 drones in 2024, with 58,889 units from China. By October 2025, imports had already reached 47,643 drones, including 47,558 from China. As officials noted, since more than 90 percent of Taiwan’s drone imports currently come from China, Chinese-made drones will be most affected.

Taiwan Plans NT$9.7 Billion Buy of Portable Anti-Drone Systems

Taiwan’s military is preparing a major purchase of portable anti-drone systems, signaling its determination to counter low-cost drone threats. 

According to a pre-tender notice on the government procurement platform, the armed forces plan to purchase 635 sets of “portable unmanned aerial vehicle countermeasure systems” with a total budget of about NT$9.67 billion (around US$310 million), funded through a special budget from 2026 to 2028.

Each set is priced at around NT$15.2 million (about US$490,000). The systems must be light enough to mount on small military or civilian vehicles and usable from both vehicles and ships. They are required to detect drones within 4 km, track more than 10 targets with 360-degree coverage, and jam or take control of drones over a range of at least 2 km across the 433 MHz–5.8 GHz band.

The army will receive 242 sets, the navy 213, the air force 72, and the Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command 108. For now, the document is only a public consultation; the formal tender and the special budget still need Cabinet approval.

The US Accelerates Drone Procurement and Urges Taiwan To Do the Same

According to a recent Reuters interview with US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll, in the coming two to three years, the Army plans to procure a million drones—at a minimum. 

With global attention on Ukraine’s effective usage of drones in warfare, the shift to more disposable, rapidly deployable comes with little surprise. However, that does not mean it comes without challenges. 

Ukraine’s asymmetric warfare strategy utilizes UAVs on an unmatched scale, manufacturing around 4 million a year. In contrast, the US’ largest military sector obtains only about 50,000 drones annually. Accordingly, the US is putting in effort to create new production channels, specifically with legislation planning a manufacturing facility in Texas with the capabilities of building 1 million drones a year. 

The US is encouraging Taiwan to similarly “do more and act faster”, as US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy nominee Welles Green stated on November 7, 2025. 

Additionally, in terms of US-TW UAV co-production, Green suggests the countries focus on technologies with relatively low technological complexity—like unmanned systems—in which Taiwan already possesses valuable, transferable capabilities in manufacturing and manpower. 

New Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Rules Impact the US Drone Market By Potentially Phasing Out Chinese Drones

Alongside this massive procurement measure, the US is taking precautions against devices that pose risks to national security.

On October 28, 2025, the US’ FCC unanimously voted to extend its jurisdiction over telecommunication equipment. Modular transmitters, which are used in UAV flight control and video systems, if manufactured by an entity on the FCC ‘Covered List’ will now be restricted regardless of previous authorization and will ban future approval of devices containing them. 

DJI, a Chinese drone manufacturer who accounts for at least 75% of the US market, is not yet on the ‘Covered List’. However, the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)’s Section 1709 demands a security review of drone manufacturers DJI and Autel to assess their threat to national security. If the audit is not completed by December 23, 2025, they will automatically be added to the list—blocking these companies’ communications or video surveillance equipment approvals and the drones that utilize them.

This deadline is currently only 22 days away and no US federal agency has begun the audit, suggesting the imminent addition of DJI and Autel to the ‘Covered List’. Creating a ripple effect, Chinese UAVs would then be phased out—granting Taiwan the opportunity to fill the gap they leave as commercial and federal organizations seek alternative non-red suppliers. 

What Do Ukrainian Co-production Opportunities Mean to Taiwan?

This November, Ukraine entered an “Enhanced Partnership” with the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)—a security coalition comprising of Northern European and Baltic countries: Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway.

This cooperation will bring about joint exercises, collaboration in the defence industry, and sharing of Ukraine’s expertise in countering hybrid attacks, implementing air defence forces, deploying drones, defending national infrastructure, and orchestrating long-range strikes. It will also give Ukraine access to European technologies and production facilities for establishing joint manufacturing. 

As Ukraine looks to diversify and fortify its defense capacity, it has increasingly turned towards co-production opportunities. 

Concurrent to the JEF meeting, Ukraine’s Defence Minister Denys Shmyhal discussed the prospects for joint drone production—notably interceptor drones—with the Netherlands’ Defence Minister; signed an MOU with Norway’s Defence Minister on common quality standards for defense products made or supplied under joint agreements; signed an MOU with the Latvian Defence Minister and discussed the development of industrial cooperation, particularly joint drone production; and signed a Letter of Intent with Sweden’s Defence Minister which considers joint development of surface-to-air missile interceptors and radar systems.

Apart from the JEF countries, President Zelensky has also recently announced that Ukraine has started co-producing interceptor drones with the US.

This declaration comes apace with the proposed US-UKR ‘Drone Deal’ which Zelensky claims would offer the US a 5-year agreement worth $50B—providing for the production of up to 10 million drones per year. While not yet cemented, this includes three cooperation options: direct procurement from Ukraine, forming joint ventures in the US or other allied countries, or establishing Ukrainian subsidiaries in the US.

If the US and Ukraine pursue the first option, they would not only be circumventing Ukraine’s export restrictions, but could also face security and certification challenges, as many Ukrainian drones still incorporate Chinese components. For Taiwan, this sets a complicated precedent: if the US accepts Ukrainian drones containing Chinese-made parts, it could make it significantly harder for Taiwanese drone manufacturers to enter the US market and sets a global standard that Chinese components are admissible—going against Taiwan’s objective of creating a non-red supply chain.