DSET Adjunct Fellow Ren-Wei Chang attended “Internet Week 2026,” hosted by the Taiwan Network Information Center (TWNIC) on May 15, where he shared insights on Taiwan’s dependence on submarine cables, network infrastructure vulnerabilities, and digital resilience challenges, while emphasizing the importance of “Local Operability.”
Internet Week 2026 was jointly organized by TWNIC in collaboration with Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs (moda), the National Communications Commission (NCC), the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC), and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), among other organizations. Through a series of forums, the event focused on issues including AI governance, digital trust, and cyber resilience, aiming to foster cross-sector dialogue between the public and private sectors.
Ren-Wei Chang was invited to speak at the session titled “Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from Ukraine for Taiwan’s Resilience Governance and Response.” The session was moderated by Wei Jeng, Deputy Director General of the Administration for Cyber Security under moda. Other panelists included Wei-Sheng Liu, Chief Azure Cloud Solution Architect for Worldwide Public Sector at Microsoft; Chien-Lung Lee, Director General of the Information Systems Department at Taiwan Power Company; and Bo-Yu Chen, Director of the Detection and Defense Center at the Institute for Information Industry.
Chang noted that international discussions surrounding Ukraine’s wartime communications resilience often focus on how the Ukrainian government migrated its digital government services to overseas cloud infrastructure, allowing critical public services and government operations to continue despite wartime attacks. However, he stressed that “Ukraine’s experience cannot be directly replicated in Taiwan.”
According to Chang, Ukraine primarily relies on terrestrial cables for international internet exchange and traffic transmission, whereas Taiwan, as an island nation, depends heavily on submarine cables for external communications. Therefore, beyond protecting submarine cable infrastructure, Taiwan should also prioritize building “Local Operability” — the ability for domestic networks and digital services to continue functioning even if Taiwan becomes disconnected from the global internet.
Chang further explained that although Taiwan enjoys some of the world’s fastest and highest-quality internet connectivity, its network infrastructure is also highly centralized, creating potential systemic risks. He cited Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) as an example: while Ukraine’s infrastructure is relatively concentrated in Kyiv, additional distributed facilities exist across eastern and western Ukraine. In contrast, most of Taiwan’s IXPs are concentrated in Taipei, with only one major node each in Taichung, Tainan, and Hsinchu. Beyond centralization risks, he also highlighted concerns over energy allocation, noting that northern Taiwan already faces growing electricity demand and may increasingly compete with the semiconductor industry for energy resources.
Chang also referenced a recent study conducted by the Open Culture Foundation examining nearly 2,000 commonly used Taiwanese websites. The research found that 47% (874 websites) either rely directly on overseas infrastructure or require external resources to function. In the event of submarine cable disruptions, these services could fail immediately. Another 42.3% (787 websites) utilize local nodes operated by multinational public cloud providers, but their control planes and authentication systems may still depend on overseas infrastructure, leaving them highly vulnerable in disconnected scenarios. Only around 10% of surveyed websites were found capable of operating reliably in offline or cable-disruption conditions.
He further pointed out that the study found LINE — used by approximately 93% of Taiwan’s population — requires traffic to be routed to Japan and back to Taiwan for account authentication. As a result, Taiwan’s most widely used civilian communication platform may not be able to operate independently under extreme circumstances, potentially disrupting communication between the public and government institutions.
Chang argued that, ideally, Taiwan should strive to keep domestic communication traffic within Taiwan whenever possible, while reserving limited international bandwidth and satellite resources for critical uses during emergencies.
In closing, Chang identified three major priorities for strengthening Taiwan’s communications resilience. First, Taiwan must assess the extent to which commonly used digital services depend on overseas resources and consider how to reduce those dependencies. Second, systems should be tested in practice to determine whether their operations and traffic routing require overseas connectivity. Third, both government agencies and private-sector organizations should begin planning for “Local Mode” operations to ensure that communications, finance, healthcare, and energy systems can continue functioning in coordinated ways during network disruptions or other extreme scenarios.
Chang emphasized that “Local Operability” is not merely a technical issue, but a core challenge for maintaining social continuity and democratic resilience in times of crisis.
Note: An Internet Exchange Point (IXP) is a physical infrastructure through which different networks exchange internet traffic directly. IXPs enable internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers to interconnect efficiently, reducing latency and improving network performance.
