Co-hosted by the Formosa Club, the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the 2025 Taiwan–Europe Undersea Cable Security Forum was held on October 26 in Taipei. Under the theme “Strengthening Digital and Energy Lifelines: Taiwan–Europe Undersea Cables Security and Strategic Resilience,” the forum explored shared challenges and opportunities for cooperation between Taiwan and Europe in ensuring the security of undersea cables. The event also formed part of the Formosa Club’s Annual Meeting series in Taipei.
The forum featured opening remarks by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung, Chair of the Formosa Club Annual Meeting and Member of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs Rihards Kols, and DSET’s Advisor Dr. Zse-Hong Tsai. Speakers included former Slovak Minister of Defense Jaroslav Naď, Executive Director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Thorsten Benner, Director of DSET’s Energy Security and Climate Resilience Program Tsaiying Lu, Section Chief for Maritime Law Enforcement of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) Commander Arthur Yang, and Principal Engineer of Chunghwa Telecom Tony Horngiye Huang. The audience comprised 42 European parliamentarians from 18 countries attending the Formosa Club Annual Meeting in Taipei, along with diplomatic representatives from various countries stationed in Taiwan.
Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung: Taiwan Launches “RISK Management Initiative on International Undersea Cables” to Build a Security Network with Democratic Partners
In his opening remarks, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung emphasized that the protection of undersea cables has transcended technical concerns and has become a shared strategic mission essential to the long-term prosperity and security of the global democratic community. He noted that frequent earthquakes, typhoons, and offshore construction in the Indo-Pacific region have repeatedly caused cable disruptions, while gray-zone operations and deliberate sabotage by China and Russia have turned cable security into a frontline issue of sovereignty and communication freedom. Lin underscored that, as the digital hub of the Indo-Pacific, the security of Taiwan’s undersea cables is now a matter of global public interest.
To address this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially launched the “RISK Management Initiative on International Undersea Cables,” aimed at establishing an institutionalized protection framework in cooperation with Europe and other democratic partners. The initiative is structured around four key action areas under the acronym “RISK”: R – Risk Mitigation: Strengthen cross-border repair coordination and rapid response mechanisms to shorten restoration times; I – Information Sharing: Build a real-time information-sharing and early-warning network among governments, industries, and international organizations; S – Systemic Reform: Promote adherence to existing international conventions such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while advocating for new norms where necessary; K – Knowledge Building: Enhance training, academic research, and multinational joint exercises to develop long-term professional capacity. Minister Lin stated that no country can safeguard undersea cables alone. Only through collaboration and collective action among democratic partners can we ensure the security and resilience of the world’s digital and energy lifelines.
DSET Advisor Zse-Hong Tsai: Strengthening Submarine Cable Resilience Is a Shared Strategic Mission for Taiwan and Europe
Dr. Zse-Hong Tsai, Advisor of DSET, emphasized that undersea cables are Taiwan’s digital lifelines, holding strategic importance equivalent to energy and defense infrastructure. Over 99% of Taiwan’s international internet bandwidth relies on submarine cables, leaving the nation more vulnerable than even Ukraine. Although the government has promoted low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite backups, challenges remain in terms of bandwidth capacity and cost efficiency. In recent years, multiple incidents involving Chinese vessels damaging cables near Taiwan have further underscored the urgent need for international cooperation.
Tsai noted that in the past six months, DSET has released several research reports analyzing vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s communications and power cable security, while drawing lessons from Europe’s institutional reforms in countering hybrid threats. He proposed that future Taiwan–Europe cooperation should focus on three priority areas: intelligence sharing and threat notification mechanisms; cross-border monitoring and cable repair technology collaboration; modernization of international laws and governance frameworks. Moreover, he stressed that Taiwan and Europe are highly complementary in the fields of technology security and democratic defense, expressing hope that this forum will serve as a policy starting point for comprehensive cooperation—from institutional alignment to technological collaboration—toward building a joint defensive framework for undersea cable security.
DSET’s Tsaiying Lu Warns: China Is Consolidating Dominance in the Global Submarine Cable Supply Chain — Taiwan and Europe Must Build Active Defense and Supply Chain Transparency Mechanisms
Tsaiying Lu, Director of the Energy Security and Climate Resilience Program at DSET, presented two recent DSET reports: “Undercurrent: Limits and Prospects of Submarine Cable Security for Taiwan” and “Vulnerabilities at Depth: Submarine Power Cable Sabotage and Supply Chain Risks Amid China’s Rise.”
Lu identified three shared challenges faced by both Taiwan and Europe in undersea cable protection. First, law enforcement and accountability. Taiwan this year recorded its first conviction of a Chinese vessel captain for damaging a submarine cable. However, due to the difficulty of proving intent, prosecutors did not invoke the national security clauses of the Telecommunications Management Act, resulting in a relatively light sentence. Moreover, both Taiwan and Europe face jurisdictional challenges in detaining offending vessels, often encountering complex multi-state legal barriers. Second, technological limitations. While both sides employ Optical Time-Domain Reflectometry (OTDR) and AI-assisted diagnostic technologies to locate cable faults, they still lack a real-time early-warning mechanism to detect suspicious maritime activities that may precede cable damage. Third, international coordination gaps. Cable incidents typically involve coordination among flag states, port states, and coastal governments, yet there remains no established intelligence-sharing framework for effective information exchange and crisis management.
Lu further warned that China is expanding its dominance across the submarine cable supply chain through massive state subsidies and the cultivation of national champion enterprises. The DSET report highlighted “Orient Cable” as a prime example—benefiting from substantial financial subsidies and tax incentives, the company has developed overcapacity, engaged in predatory pricing, and aggressively expanded its presence in Europe. Such developments could, Lu cautioned, increase the democratic world’s dependence on Chinese cable technologies in the coming years.
To mitigate these risks, Lu outlined four key policy recommendations: (1) designate submarine power cables as “critical infrastructure,” aligning their protection status with that of telecommunications cables (2) include core submarine cable components in strategic materials control regimes to strengthen oversight (3) enhance risk assessment and supply-chain transparency at both the national and international levels (4) develop Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) technology to transform submarine cables from passive protection assets into active sensing systems, thereby improving early-warning and defense capabilities.
Panel Discussion: Experts Call for Accelerated Institutional Reform and Enhanced Technical Cooperation on Cable Protection
Former Slovak Minister of Defense Jaroslav Naď noted that the majority of global submarine cable damage incidents occur outside national jurisdictions, making law enforcement and attribution extremely challenging. He emphasized that submarine cable disruptions not only interrupt communications but can also undermine NATO and allied military operations, declaring that “the security of undersea cables is strategic security.”
Thorsten Benner, Co-Founder of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi), underscored that both Europe and Taiwan remain insufficient in establishing accountability and deterrence mechanisms. He argued that governments must take the lead in building redundancy and repair capacity, stressing that “market mechanisms alone cannot generate resilience — state investment is indispensable.”
Tony Horngiye Huang, Senior Engineer at Chunghwa Telecom’s Network Technology Division, shared practical experiences from cable repair operations. He recalled that during the 2006 Bashi Channel earthquake, 18 submarine cables were simultaneously damaged, prompting the government to invest in multi-route redundancy and seismic avoidance design. Taiwan then doubled the number of international submarine cables to fourteen to further strengthen system redundancy and resilience.
Commander Arthur Yang, Section Chief for Maritime Law Enforcement of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration, analyzed the enforcement challenges faced by the CGA and offered three policy recommendations: (1) establish a shared database between Taiwan and Europe on blacklisted and substandard vessels to enhance international information sharing and cooperation (2) exchange case studies and best practices on jurisdictional applications between coastal and flag states, particularly concerning substandard and “flags of convenience” vessels (3) promote the negotiation of a new international convention to replace the outdated 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cable, which no longer reflects modern technological realities.
