The Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET) hosted a cross-party delegation of Ukrainian parliamentarians on July 6 for an exchange on gray-zone threats, energy security, and drone supply chain resilience, with a particular focus on wartime lessons from Ukraine that may offer valuable insights for Taiwan.

The delegation included Ukrainian lawmakers Yulia Sirko, Ihor Huz, Sviatoslav Yurash, and Oksana Savchuk. Among them, Yurash is a member of Servant of the People, the party of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, while Sirko is affiliated with Holos Party. Both Yurash and Sirko are also members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) and have expressed strong support for Taiwan.

DSET first introduced two policy reports published this year by its National Security Team on Taiwan–Ukraine and Taiwan–Europe drone cooperation. DSET noted that Taiwan’s drone exports have grown significantly in recent years: in the first four months of this year alone, Taiwan exported 181,159 drones, surpassing last year’s total annual export volume and marking nearly twentyfold growth compared to the same period last year. Despite this rapid growth, however, Taiwan’s drone industry continues to face a number of structural challenges, including high manufacturing costs, insufficient domestic procurement, and limited foreign government procurement.

DSET further pointed out that a substantial gap remains between Taiwan’s current drone capabilities and its actual defense requirements, underscoring the need to draw on Ukraine’s battlefield experience and technical know-how. The average width of the Taiwan Strait—around 180 kilometers—places much higher demands on drone range, communications, and wind resistance. Yet Taiwan’s exports are still dominated by short-range FPV drones, while longer-range platforms and interceptor drones for counter-UAS operations remain in comparatively short supply.

As Ukraine begins exporting drones and unmanned surface vessels, its cooperation with other countries continues to deepen. However, Ukraine and Taiwan still lack collaboration in joint production and research and development, and DSET calls on both sides to continue advancing such cooperation.

DSET’s Energy Resilience Program noted that Taiwan’s power generation relies heavily on imported energy. If China were to cut off those imports through a blockade, the impact on Taiwan would be severe, underscoring that future conflict may be more likely to occur at sea rather than on land. Against this backdrop, DSET has continued to examine how Russia’s large-scale military exercises in the Sea of Azov gradually escalated into port blockades, maritime blockades, and ultimately a full-scale invasion, as well as how Ukraine responded to these developments.

DSET also shared differences between Taiwan and Ukraine in communications resilience. Taiwan relies on undersea cables for 99 percent of its external communications, while incidents of cable damage have already occurred in waters surrounding Taiwan in recent years. In addition, most of Taiwan’s internet exchange points (IXPs) are concentrated in Taipei, creating risks associated with over-centralization. These experiences suggest that in the face of gray-zone threats and potential conflict, Taiwan must continue to bolster the resilience of its energy systems, communications networks, and other critical infrastructure.

DSET expressed our appreciation to the delegation for sharing Ukraine’s experience and offering recommendations for Taiwan. It noted that although Taiwan and Ukraine face different geopolitical environments, both confront similar challenges related to gray-zone coercion, energy vulnerability, and the security of critical infrastructure. The exchange deepened mutual understanding of hybrid warfare risks and provided important reference points for Taiwan as it seeks to strengthen its drone capabilities, energy resilience, and overall defense preparedness.