On September 9, 2025, the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER) jointly organized a side forum at the venue of SEMICON Taiwan 2025 International Semiconductor Exhibition — the “2025 Forum on Semiconductors and Geopolitics: Navigating Supply Chain Resilience and Strategic Realignment.” The forum examined challenges and opportunities for the semiconductor industry amid global strategic realignments. Speakers from eight countries, including the United States, Japan, Europe, Africa, and Vietnam, analyzed their respective semiconductor supply chain cooperation with Taiwan. The forum also featured three authors of major books on semiconductors and geopolitics: Marc Hijink, author of Focus: The ASML Way on ASML’s rise; Ota Yasuhiko, author of 2030 Semiconductor Geopolitics; and Dr. Philip Wong, contributor to Silicon Triangle: The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security. Minister of Foreign Affairs Chia-Lung Lin delivered opening remarks in person.

In his speech, Minister Lin highlighted that this is the first time MOFA has co-organized a seminar at SEMICON Taiwan with SEMI, with speakers representing industry, government, and academia from eight countries, underscoring Taiwan’s strategic role in global semiconductor supply chains amid today’s geopolitical turbulence. He emphasized that Taiwan occupies a key position across the AI value chain — from chip manufacturing, packaging and testing, AI server assembly, to data center construction. Whether it is the U.S. “Stargate Project,” Nvidia and Apple’s $500 billion AI investment plans, or the AI strategies of Google, Amazon, Meta, and Microsoft, Taiwan’s supply chain plays an indispensable role. Lin noted that Taiwan not only participates deeply in infrastructure for U.S. AI initiatives but also hopes to partner with the U.S. in AI chips, models, and applications to jointly build a “Taiwan-U.S. Joint Fleet” in AI technology, helping the U.S. maintain its leading edge. At the same time, collaboration would allow Taiwanese enterprises to leverage U.S. markets, technology, talent, and capital, strengthening the democratic supply chain and enhancing mutual economic resilience.

Looking ahead, Minister Lin stressed that MOFA will continue to uphold the spirit of “comprehensive diplomacy,” working hand-in-hand with industry to form a “new flying-geese international fleet.” Through a model of “large leading small, combining hard and soft power, public-private partnership, and domestic-international circulation,” and by joining forces with industry associations such as SEMI and TEEMA, Taiwan can further integrate with the world. He added: “I firmly believe that ‘Trusted Technology Taiwan’ will become the best and indispensable partner for democratic nations worldwide in advancing AI development.”

The forum revolved around three main themes: “Strategic Realignments: Dialogue on Supply Chain Resilience,” “Semiconductors in Motion: Navigating Strategic Shifts in the Global Landscape,” and “Emerging Roles in Global Technology: From Semiconductors to Digital Innovation.” Discussions explored how Taiwan can secure its supply chain while expanding cooperation with democratic allies under the evolving U.S.–China technology rivalry.

Speakers analyzed the challenges posed by Trump’s new policies and evolving U.S.–China trade negotiations. Lennart Heim, Compute Lead at RAND Technology and Security Policy Center, noted that while there remains bipartisan consensus in Washington on restricting China’s access to AI chipmaking capabilities, debate continues over whether U.S.-made AI chips should flow into China. He warned that the Trump administration currently treats export controls as bargaining chips in trade talks, rather than as national security priorities. Stanford professor and Silicon Triangle contributor Dr. Philip Wong added that under the Trump administration, uncertainties surrounding CHIPS Act subsidies for manufacturing and R&D have increased, with U.S. semiconductor research teams facing significant funding cuts — a development that could weaken America’s long-term competitiveness against China.

In response to these challenges, speakers emphasized the importance of regional alliances. Peter Fatelnig, Minister-Counsellor for Digital Economy Policy, Delegation of the European Union to Japan, noted that security policy cooperation has become inseparable from supply chain policy. Existing frameworks such as the Australia-UK-U.S. (AUKUS) trilateral pact, though originating in submarine construction, are expected to expand into emerging technology collaboration. Marc Hijink highlighted the Netherlands-led European Chips Alliance initiative, which continues to expand, and argued that global outreach of such cooperation is both necessary and reasonable.

On Taiwan-Japan cooperation, Satoshi Inomata, Senior Chief Researcher, JETRO Institute of Developing Economies, explained that since Japan introduced the Economic Security Promotion Act in 2022, it has successfully reinforced investor confidence in industries tied to national security. To strengthen Indo-Pacific supply chain security, he advocated that Japan, Taiwan, and allies adopt a strategy of “Deterrence by Denial” against Chinese economic coercion. Professor Yasuhiko Ota of Hokkaido University, author of 2030 Semiconductor Geopolitics, echoed calls for regional alliances. He noted that despite Japan’s current political instability, policies to bolster Japan’s semiconductor capabilities and cooperation with Taiwan remain unchanged. He added that although Japan and South Korea have traditionally struggled to collaborate, stronger trilateral supply chain ties among Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea would help address present challenges.

In the third panel, which focused on critical material supply chains and emerging semiconductor markets, speakers from Europe, Asia, and Africa emphasized that the industry’s future will no longer depend on a single hub but instead on diverse, complementary, and resilient global networks. Tobiáš Lipold, research fellow at Czech think tank Sinopsis, pointed out that Czechia, leveraging its strengths in precision optics, cybersecurity, and engineering, is deepening European links through R&D and talent cooperation with Taiwan.

Young entrepreneurs Mathias Léopoldie and Joelle Itoua Owona, who visited Taiwan with the French-African Foundation, stressed Africa’s enormous potential in smartphone adoption, fintech payments, and critical minerals. They noted Africa’s shift from raw material supplier to refining, design, and assembly, and expressed hope to accelerate this transition through Taiwanese training and technology transfer. Nguyễn Khánh Linh, Director of the Semiconductor Division at Vietnam’s National Innovation Center, further highlighted Vietnam’s role as a base for Samsung, Apple, Intel, and Nvidia, combining abundant STEM talent with political stability to rapidly boost its manufacturing and R&D capacity. Collectively, the four speakers underscored that Taiwan, with its comprehensive development model and resilience, is poised to become a core hub in building safe, reliable, and democratic supply chains.

Note:
The Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET) was established by Taiwan’s National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) in 2023. However, this event was independently organized by DSET. All press notices, forum remarks, and post-event records represent only DSET’s views and not those of the NSTC. Media outlets are kindly reminded to take note when drafting reports.

Media Contact:
Éli Chen
Policy Analyst and International Communications Manager
Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET)
[email protected]
Tel: (02)2596-5550 #522