DSET Adjunct Researcher Ren-Wei Chang attended the forum “What Would Happen If Taiwan’s Submarine Cables Were Cut?” on June 8. Chang joined speakers from the fields of communications security, industry research, and internet infrastructure—including cybersecurity engineer Li-heng Yu and Jen-wei Chang, Senior Industry Analyst at the Market Intelligence & Consulting Institute (MIC), Institute for Information Industry—to discuss issues such as undersea cables, low Earth orbit satellites, domestic network infrastructure, and disaster response. In addition to keynote presentations, the forum also used the live Q&A session to explore a range of issues closely connected to everyday life, including how to maintain basic communications during an internet outage, how communities can prepare, what risks may arise when positioning systems are disrupted, and whether communications resilience can be incorporated into building and urban-space design.
During the forum, Chang noted that Taiwan’s communications security should not be understood only in terms of “adding more submarine cables” or “purchasing satellite terminals.” Instead, Taiwan must consider whether society can continue to maintain basic operations under extreme conditions. Submarine cables remain the backbone of Taiwan’s international connectivity, while low Earth orbit satellites can serve as backup tools for government agencies, emergency responders, medical institutions, outlying islands, and critical infrastructure. However, without prior mapping, deployment management, power backup, and cross-sector exercises, no single technology can fully deliver resilience during a crisis.
During the Q&A session, participants asked whether Taiwan should develop offline communications or local communications networks in the event of network outages, power disruptions, or regional connectivity failures. Chang responded that network resilience and energy resilience should be considered separately. Even if international links or regional backbone networks are disrupted, local communications, fixed-line telephones, local servers, community notice systems, schools, and borough offices may still serve as important nodes in disaster response. He emphasized that, under high-pressure conditions, society cannot rely solely on looking up information online after a disaster occurs. Community organizations, supply storage, evacuation routes, and information dissemination procedures must be established in advance.
In response to questions about satellite positioning and alternative systems, Chang also warned that communications resilience is not only about whether networks remain connected, but also about positioning and timing capabilities. Many communications devices, drones, base stations, satellite terminals, and power systems depend to varying degrees on GPS or other global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). In gray-zone conflict or wartime scenarios, positioning interference could affect drone operations, satellite terminal connectivity, base station synchronization, and even the management of certain critical infrastructure systems. Taiwan should therefore assess how dependent its critical systems are on GNSS and consider backup solutions for positioning, timing, and synchronization.
Another part of the discussion focused on architecture and spatial planning. Participants asked whether new buildings or large public spaces should incorporate communications equipment, disaster-response nodes, and multi-path cable entry designs from the outset. Speakers noted that if server rooms and important facilities can adopt cable entry routes from different directions and avoid concentrating multiple fiber-optic lines along the same path, this would help reduce the risk of single points of failure caused by construction damage or deliberate sabotage. Chang added that some Nordic countries have converted Cold War-era civil defense shelters into public spaces for everyday use while retaining functions for sheltering, communications, and emergency response. Such experiences are worth further study as Taiwan considers urban resilience and disaster preparedness.
The Q&A session also touched on the integration of drones, low Earth orbit satellites, and multi-domain communications. Speakers noted that future disaster response and security defense may increasingly rely on multiple types of communications nodes operating together, including ground base stations, satellite terminals, drones, maritime platforms, and local networks. This means that communications resilience is not only a task for telecom operators or government agencies. Local governments, communities, architects and planners, technology industries, and civil society organizations must also take part.
DSET believes that Taiwan’s challenges in submarine cable disruption, satellite backup, positioning interference, and the continuity of domestic digital services require a resilience governance framework more closely aligned with real-world usage scenarios. In addition to continued attention to submarine cable security and low Earth orbit satellite policy, future discussions should also include fixed-line telephones, local networks, community nodes, GNSS backup, building cable-entry design, and cross-sector exercises. Only by linking technical solutions, institutional arrangements, and social organization can Taiwan maintain the basic functions of a democratic society under natural disasters, gray-zone conflict, or extreme network disruption scenarios.
