Executive Summary
Ukraine’s asymmetric utilization of drones has changed the face of modern warfare. Now, every country in the world is striving to learn, adapt, and keep pace. As the Russo-Ukrainian War persists, Ukraine has sought new paths to increase defense resiliency, which Taiwan strives to emulate under increasing geopolitical pressure. In consideration of the exchange of technologies and tactics between Russia and China, it is especially crucial that Taiwan likewise learns from Ukraine.
This report draws on interviews with more than 50 drone manufacturers and relevant institutions in Taiwan, Ukraine, and Europe, and combines publicly available policy documents and trade data to map the progress of Taiwan–Ukraine cooperation and provide policy recommendations.
I. Progress & Challenges in Taiwan’s Drone Industry
Striving to match Ukraine’s resiliency, Taiwan has begun incorporating drone technology into its national defense strategy.
Historically, Taiwan’s UAV industry continues to face three structural constraints: limited production scale, persistent reliance on foreign technologies, and supply-chain bottlenecks. To address these entrenched vulnerabilities, the October 2025 national UAV development and procurement framework establishes a targeted roadmap for industrial maturity. It contains four main strategic pillars to escalate industry development, enhance defense autonomy, and create a resilient non-red supply chain:
1) Expanding Domestic and International Demand
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) initiated the largest drone procurement plan in Taiwan’s history in July 2025. By 2027, Taiwan plans to acquire 48,750 units across five drone types, with the bulk being Group 1 FPVs. Complementing this, the Executive Yuan aims to consolidate 50,898 additional systems for civilian and interagency use, with delivery scheduled for 2027 and 2028.
On top of this, Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense disclosed details of the Special Budget for Strengthening Defense Resilience and Asymmetric Capabilities, for 2026-2033 with a provisional ceiling of USD $40 billion (NT$1.25 trillion). The plan combines foreign acquisitions with large-scale domestic procurement, including roughly 200,000 UAVs, over 1,000 uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), and multiple counter-UAS systems.
To further extend its UAV market into the international sphere, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs established the Taiwan Excellence Drone International Business Opportunities Alliance (TEDIBOA) in September 2024. TEDIBOA has signed twelve memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with UAV industry associations and partner organizations in the United States, Poland, Czechia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Japan, and Ukraine.
2) Fostering Technological advancement and international cooperation
Taiwan uses targeted subsidy programs to close capability gaps in its drone sector and localize enabling technologies. On the civilian-industrial side, the MOEA’s subsidy effort has emphasized UAV-specific chips and modules, including AI vision chips, flight-control systems, and secure communications modules. On the defense R&D side, the MND has launched a cross-domain program for 2026-2028 to integrate the government, industry, and academia in developing core unmanned-system enabling technologies across air, surface, and subsurface domains.
DSET’s research also indicates that at least 33 MoUs were signed between Taiwanese UAV companies and foreign partners between June and September 2025, with the United States accounting for the largest share.
3) Forming industry clusters and ecosystems
Taiwan has been building shared infrastructure to reduce fragmentation across the drone supply chain. Two government-backed facilities play distinct roles: the Minxiong Aerospace and UAV Industrial Park and the Asia UAV AI Innovation Application R&D Center.
Concurrently, Taiwan has begun expanding testing infrastructure. Government planning calls for the development of more than 18 test ranges of different sizes.
Lastly, this pillar includes the establishment of unmanned-systems innovation laboratories in Tainan’s Shalun and Liujia districts, with a stated focus on developing drones capable of operating in harsh or contested environments and an expected output of 26 innovative drone models.
4) Improving regulatory frameworks for unmanned vehicles
This work spans four main tracks: updating domestic UAV rules and testing standards; standardizing public-sector procurement and use guidelines; developing management rules for uncrewed surface and underwater vessels (USVs/UUVs); and improving certification and authorization capacity with greater international recognition.
Taiwan has begun linking parts of its industrial base to U.S. trusted-technology frameworks. On September 20th, 2025, Taiwan’s Thunder Tiger became the first Taiwanese firm to add its “Overkill” FPV drone to the U.S. Blue UAS Cleared List. Additionally, in January 2026, the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) and Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) announced a cooperation agreement under which ITRI will participate in AUVSI’s Green UAS program―a streamlined certification pathway aligned with Blue UAS Cleared status―as a Recognized Cybersecurity Assessor.
II. Analysis of Ukraine’s UAV Success
Ukraine’s approach to secure its drone supply chain, in particular, was made possible by striking a balance between the localization of cheap, low-tech first person view (FPV) drones, and co-production of higher-tech, higher attribute drones. Ukraine is currently co-producing drones with at least 20 countries. Among these allies, the top five countries submitting requests to Ukrainian manufacturers are Lithuania, the U.S., the UK, Czechia, and Latvia.
Moreover, long range drones and interceptors have the most number of joint projects identifying them as key strategic priorities in asymmetric warfare. Based on its other ventures, Ukraine is also actively striving to procure more attack drones, air defense systems, and maritime unmanned systems.
Pointedly, cooperation models vary: Ukraine’s collaboration with Turkiye and Germany is focused on establishing domestic subsidiaries and building factories for proven systems like the TB2 and Vector drones within Ukraine. A second model with the United States and United Kingdom aims at advanced technology integration, especially developing AI-driven interceptor drones and plugging frontline data into production lines. Finally, Ukraine has partnerships with nations like Denmark and Czechia to manufacture Ukrainian-designed drones abroad to secure supply chains. This effectively helps Ukraine create redundancy and diversifies their UAV supply chain. Based on current open-source reporting, none of the above arrangements involve Taiwan at this time.
Another experience Ukraine highlights is the prioritization of de-centralized procurement under a central framework to quicken delivery time and allow for continuous feedback loops between manufacturers and military units themselves. This catalyzes innovation.
Evident from the recent surge of MoUs and Letter of Intents with Ukraine and its allies, Ukraine is still continuously seeking the expansion of safe, joint-venture drone manufacturing facilities abroad. In conjunction, this method allows for financial backing―which Ukraine desperately needs―by way of allies’ subsidiaries.
III. Current Taiwan-Ukraine UAV Cooperation
As it stands, cooperation between Taiwan and Ukraine centers on business-to-business (B2B) component sales of Taiwanese flight controllers, batteries, motors, and other microelectronics to Ukrainian companies. According to Ukrainian and Taiwanese entities interviewed by DSET, out of 61 UAV related companies, 7 Ukrainian companies source the aforementioned flight controllers, batteries, motors, and other microelectronics from 4 Taiwanese companies.
While direct engagement remains limited, Taiwanese companies are working in greater volume with Polish and Czech firms to supply both components and complete drone units for transfer to Ukraine. According to DSET interviews with drone industry stakeholders, including major manufacturers, this demand in Ukraine drove Taiwan’s drone exports to Central Europe in 2025, totaling 70,372 units to Czechia and 31,711 units to Poland, although it cannot be ascertained through public information whether this is the exact amount being transferred to Ukraine.
Directly, Taiwan exported $20,246,206 USD to Ukraine from 2022-2025, with the majority of direct Taiwanese exports to Ukraine consisting of Group 1 drones weighing more than 250 grams, but no more than 7KG (HS code 8806.22) in 2025.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Taiwan Excellence Drone International Business Opportunities Alliance (TEDIBOA) and Ukraine’s Iron Cluster has further elevated cooperation to the level of quasi-official industrial partners.
Policy Recommendations
A collaborative Taiwan-Ukraine drone industry relation would be reciprocal and advantageous. To transition from ad-hoc assistance to a strategic alliance,
Taiwan should consider the following recommendations:
- In the short-term, Taiwan should focus on supplying Ukraine with components, specifically for batteries and battery cells; motors; flight controllers and other microelectronics.
Ukraine’s immediate realities require a mass supply of ‘good enough’ cost-effective, consumable components that can be delivered quickly. Due to political constraints, Taiwan can start by exporting to Ukraine’s neighboring countries―a form of paradiplomacy. As a result, this creates a long-term partnership where Ukraine―projected to become a global drone hub post-war―relies on Taiwanese inputs for future exports.
- In the long term, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) should coordinate investment into TW-UKR co-production infrastructure both abroad and domestically, especially on long range and interceptor drones using Taiwanese, drone-specific chips.
Ukraine’s allies have gained trust by investing directly into Ukrainian companies, leading to joint ventures both in Ukraine and abroad. Ukraine and Taiwan are in need of these models, given that Ukraine does not have a strong domestic foundational manufacturing base for these higher-attribute drones. Taiwan moreover needs to consider long range ISR.
- Taiwan should establish a channel where Ukrainian feedback on component performance in GPS-denied environments is fed back to Taiwanese manufacturers. This could be achieved through 3 main pathways:
By pursuing targeted partnerships, Taiwan is granted access to Ukraine’s combat-proven technologies in exchange for manufacturing capacity.
- Simplify Bureaucratic Import Procedures for Ukrainian companies partnered with Taiwanese companies to enter the Taiwanese market. For example, testing and classification procedures can be streamlined.
Taiwanese products become trusted, certified, and interoperable with other Ukraine’s drones. This would increase exports and contribute to Taiwan’s ‘non-red’ supply chain objectives.
- Taiwan should organize long-term educational cooperation, for industry players and students alike, centered on defense technology and cybersecurity. Interviews suggest the critical need for Taiwanese companies in particular to get hands-on experience in Ukraine.
Develop the next generation of talent that compounds Ukrainian and Taiwanese technology expertise. Concurrently, this deepens non-formalized diplomatic relations by creating enduring people to people connections.
