The National Security Program of the Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET) held a policy report launch event on April 23 titled “Taiwan–Ukraine and Taiwan–Europe Drone Cooperation” and released two research reports: Drone Superpower: Ukraine’s UAV Success and Where Taiwan-Ukraine Cooperation Fits In and The Invisible Drone Wall: Taiwan’s Quiet Support for a China-Free European Drone Supply Chain. The reports find that cooperation between Taiwan, Europe, and Ukraine in drone supply chains has grown rapidly.
In 2025, Taiwan exported nearly 130,000 drones to Poland and Czechia, most of which were subsequently sent to Ukraine. In the first quarter of 2026, Taiwan’s exports to Central and Eastern Europe already exceeded the total for all of last year. At the same time, Taiwanese-made components have gradually become an important alternative for Chinese products. However, exports still consist mainly of low-priced items and are largely driven by non-government procurement, making them less stable. The reports therefore recommend strengthening joint production, technology transfer, and standards integration to deepen supply chain cooperation between Taiwan, Europe, and Ukraine.
The event was moderated by DSET National Security Program Policy Analyst Cathy Fang. Report authors Samara Duerr, Policy Analyst in DSET’s National Security Program, and Ting-Wei Lin, Non-Resident Fellow at DSET, presented the Taiwan–Ukraine and Taiwan–Europe reports, respectively. Both reports are based on DSET’s interviews conducted between 2024 and 2025 with more than 50 Taiwanese, Ukrainian, and European drone companies and related organizations, as well as analysis of public policy and trade data.
The event also featured Max Lo, President of the Taiwan National Drone Industry Association, and Mick Ryan, retired Australian major general and Senior Fellow for Military Studies at the Lowy Institute, as discussants. Nearly 100 participants attended, including representatives from foreign missions, international media, and industry.
Taiwan’s International Drone Cooperation: Expanding Exports to Europe, Deeper Co-Production Ties with the United States
On Taiwan’s drone development, moderator Cathy Fang noted that compared with DSET’s estimate of annual production at around 10,000 units in 2024 and the first half of 2025, Taiwan’s production capacity grew significantly from 2025 through the first quarter of 2026. In 2025, Taiwan exported nearly 130,000 drones to Poland and Czechia, most of which were then sent to Ukraine. In the first quarter of 2026, exports to Europe reached 136,010 units, already surpassing the previous year’s full-year total. However, Taiwan’s exports still mainly consist of low-priced small drones and are not part of formal government procurement, leaving demand unstable. More broadly, Taiwan’s industry continues to face constraints, including limited production capacity, reliance on foreign technology, and dependence on China for some components and raw materials.
Fang also noted that in October 2025, Taiwan’s Executive Yuan introduced the Integrated Program for Uncrewed Vehicle Industry Development, which emphasizes international procurement and technology cooperation. At present, Taiwan–US cooperation is more developed in technology, joint production, and standards coordination, though US procurement remains limited. Europe, by contrast, is Taiwan’s main export market, but cooperation in joint production and technology remains relatively underdeveloped.
Taiwan–Ukraine Cooperation: Sharp Growth in Exports, Calls for Joint Production
On progress in Taiwan–Ukraine drone cooperation, Samara Duerr, author of Drone Superpower: Ukraine’s UAV Success and Where Taiwan-Ukraine Cooperation Fits In, noted that the Taiwan Excellence Drone International Business Opportunities Alliance (TEDIBOA), established with support from Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, signed a memorandum of cooperation with a Ukrainian drone cluster in September 2025, marking the first publicly disclosed cooperation agreement between the two sides. Since 2025, Taiwan–Ukraine cooperation has continued to deepen, covering both complete systems and components. Based on DSET interviews and industry data, many of the drones Taiwan exports to Central and Eastern Europe are purchased by Ukrainian private actors and then transferred for use in Ukraine. Components such as batteries, motors, flight control boards, and airframes are also being supplied steadily to local manufacturers, suggesting that a “non-red” supply chain is gradually taking shape.
Duerr also noted that Drone Superpower documents drone cooperation agreements Ukraine has signed with 20 countries to date, showing how Ukraine is using technology exports and co-production to secure funding, expand domestic production capacity, and focus on interceptor drones and long-range strike drones. The report recommends that Taiwan prioritize co-production in Taiwan of these two categories of drones with Ukraine in order to strengthen Taiwan’s counter-drone capabilities and deterrence. In addition, the report recommends four further steps building on existing cooperation: supporting the stable supply of components, establishing a mechanism for battlefield-experience feedback, streamlining Ukraine’s drone import procedures for cooperation with Taiwanese firms, and developing cooperation on drone operator training.
Taiwan–Europe Cooperation: Focus on Poland, Czechia, and Lithuania; Taiwan Still Absent from EU Policy Frameworks
On Taiwan–Europe cooperation, Ting-Wei Lin, author of “The Invisible Drone Wall: Taiwan’s Quiet Support for a China-Free European Drone Supply Chain”, noted that Taiwan’s exports of complete drones to Europe increased from 2,574 units in 2024 to 107,433 in 2025, a roughly 41.7-fold increase, with Poland and Czechia accounting for most of the growth. Overall, Taiwan’s closest cooperation has been with Poland, Lithuania, and Czechia. Industry associations supported by the Taiwanese government have taken the lead in signing cooperation agreements, and component manufacturers are also planning local production. By contrast, Taiwan’s cooperation with Western European countries such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom remains more limited and is mostly confined to firm-to-firm partnerships.
Lin added that although Taiwan is already materially supplying Europe’s drone sector in support of its “drone wall” policy objective, the partnership still faces significant challenges. At the EU policy level, while the European Parliament passed a resolution in January 2026 urging cooperation with Taiwan, the EU’s current Defence Readiness Roadmap to 2030 still prioritizes cooperation with member states, NATO, Japan, and India, without including Taiwan—rendering it, in effect, an “invisible nation.” Moreover, even though Central and Eastern Europe is Taiwan’s largest export market and some countries have explicitly promoted “non-red” supply chains, China continues to dominate those markets. For example, in the first three quarters of 2025, Taiwan ranked only fourth among Poland’s drone import sources and second in Czechia, while China remained the largest supplier in both cases.
Lin argued that the next key step in Taiwan–Europe cooperation is institutionalization. On Taiwan’s side, this means strengthening “non-red” certification for components and improving technical support, maintenance, and service capabilities in Europe. For the EU, it means establishing clearer certification, procurement, and supplier-screening mechanisms so that trusted non-red partners can be incorporated into the system. Central and Eastern Europe could further promote joint testing, local assembly, and maintenance support to shorten validation cycles, while Western Europe could focus on dual-use technologies, modular integration, and collaboration on higher-end systems.
Expert Comments
Mick Ryan noted that over the past more than four years, Ukraine has provided an invaluable testing ground in which autonomous systems and artificial intelligence have fundamentally transformed battlefield operations, long-range strike capabilities, and air defense warfare. Yet beyond the technologies themselves and industrial production capacity, what matters even more is a shift in mindset. With the large-scale deployment of drones across the air, land, and maritime domains, we need entirely new concepts for operations and support, new types of organizations such as Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Force, and completely new approaches to personnel training in order to employ these technologies effectively. Mick stressed that “we have no time to waste,” because adversaries including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are learning and adapting rapidly, and “we must do the same.”
Max Lo also pointed out that the world is undergoing a transformation in asymmetric warfare, with drones evolving from reconnaissance tools into primary weapons of destruction. In addition to delivering an exceptionally high return on investment, they also generate severe psychological warfare effects. Ukraine is expected to produce 7 million drones annually by 2026, yet more than 90 percent of its key components still depend on China, which has in turn weaponized export restrictions. Taiwan possesses key technological capabilities, including TSMC’s 6-nanometer chips that can support swarm computing for drone fleets. It should therefore establish large-scale production lines, overcome supply bottlenecks in batteries and communication modules, and help democratic allies advance supply chain de-risking.
